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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEYS-UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAWNEGLIGENCE PER SE FOR WHICH LIABLE TO
INJURED PERSON OTHER THAN CLIENT
Plaintiff, sole legatee under an invalid will drawn by defendant, a
-notary public, in violation of a statute limiting the practice of law to
active members of the state bar, brought an action for damages for
the difference in the amount she would have received had the will been
valid and the lesser amount which was actually distributed to her
by intestate succession. Defendant had erroneously advised the
decedent that an unattested will was valid if it was notarized. On
appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, affirmed. The unauthorized practice of law in violation of a statute limiting the practice
to licensed attorneys is negligence per se, and the unauthorized practitioner is liable in damages to a party not his client who is injured
thereby. Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63 (Calif. 1957).
The occasional drafting of legal instruments when not done for
remuneration nor as an occupation, by a person who merely acts
as an amanuensis, is not generally considered as falling within the
meaning of the term "practice of law";' but the rendering of such
service with advice or counsel as to legal effect and validity,2 or
with a charge for the service,3 brings it within the meaning of the
term. One engaged in the practice of law is liable to his client on the
basis of negligence for any damage caused by his failure to exercise
reasonable care and skill in the drafting of legal instruments, 4 the
care and skill required being that which would be exercised by other
members of the profession.5 No case has been found on the unauthor1. Re Opinion of Justices, 289 Mass. 607 (1935); State ex rel. Wright v.
Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N.W. 95 (1936); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171
Atl. 883 (1934) (drawing deeds and mortgages in connection with one's own
business).

2. Re Opinion of Justices, supra note 1; In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E.

210 (1909) (dictum). A distinction has been made in drawing simple legal
instruments and those which are more complex. Cain v. Merchants Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936). However, this distinction
is difficult to apply in particular situations and, thus, has been questioned.
People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666, (1919);
Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
3. In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930).
The element of compensation alone may not be enough to bring the act within
the meaning of the term. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 Atl. 98 (1897).
4. In re Duntley, 227 Fed. 381 (7th Cir., 1915); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102
N.J.L. 381, 132 Atl. 102 (1926); Tonn v. Pier, 82 N.J. Eq. 422, 89 Atl. 510 (1914).
5. Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 Atl. 98 (1897).
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ized practice of law in violation of statute as negligence.6 In the
related field of the practice of medicine, however, it has been held
that the mere fact that the defendant practiced without having obtained a license as required by statute is not even evidence of negligence in an action for malpractice,? the question being not whether
defendant was licensed but whether he exercised proper care in the
treatment of patients.8 If, however, the violation of the statute can
be found to be the proximate cause of the injury, liability to the patient
may result. 9
6. Violation of a statute as negligence is subject to three views, where the
statute was designed to prevent the kind of injury complained of, and the
plaintiff is one of a class which the statute was intended to protect. For a
general discussion see, PROSSER, TORTS 161 (2d ed. 1955). On this subject see
also 6 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1949); 12 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 144 (1955).
One view is that a violation is negligence per se. Cosby v. Flowers, 249 Ala.
227, 30 So. 2d 694 (1947); Wilson v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 200 Ga. 207,
36 S.E.2d 757 (1946); Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga.
870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938); Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E.2d 896
(1951); Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W.2d 70 (1948); Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); Null v. Electric Power Board,
30 Tenn. App. 696, 210 S.W.2d 490 (1948); Kingsul Theatres v. Quillen, 29
Tenn. App. 248, 196 S.W.2d 316 (1946); Stearn v. Williams, 12 Tenn. App. 427
(1930); Crist v. Fitzgerald, 189 Va. 109, 52 S.E.2d 145 (1949); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, §§ 285-86 (1934); James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95 (1951); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 21, 27 (1949). In Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, supra, the court said: "Generally speaking, the violation of a statute
prohibiting a particular act or requiring a particular precaution is negligence
as a matter of law. It has long been the rule in this state that 'Where a standard of duty is fixed, and its measure defined by law, the omission of that
duty is negligence per se' . . . , when the duty was owed to the person injured
through the violation thereof." 98 N.E.2d at 899. Thus, the basic proposition is,
under this view, that the statute established the standard of care to be exercised, and violation of the statute is, therefore, conduct which falls below the
standard. In Martin v. Herzog, supra, Judge Cardozo, in speaking of the
standard as established by the legislature, says "jurors have no dispensing
power by which to relax it." Id. at 815. Another view is that a violation gives
rise to a presumption of negligence. Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 193 Atl.
877 (1937); Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 Atl. 593 (1928). This view is
based on the assumption that there may be circumstances under which a
prudent man would not conform to the standard of the statute, and thus the
standard established by the statute is not absolute. The court said in Landry
v. Hubert, supra: "Granted that the violation of such a statute as this will
usually place the wrongdoer outside the prudent man classification, to rule
that it always does so takes away from the jury the right to apply the prudent
man test at all, whenever such a statute has been transgressed." Continuing,
the court said, "It gives rise to a rebuttable, rather than a conclusive, presumption of negligence, and proof of the attendant circumstances may, in a civil
case, counterbalance or overcome the effect of the statute." 141 Atl. at 594.
A third view is that a violation is merely evidence of negligence. Evers v.
Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 Atl. 677 (1914); Clark v. Boston & Maine R.R., 64
N.H. 323, 10 Atl. 676 (1897). This view is based on the conclusion that the
statute gives rise to no civil action when it is violated, none being provided
in the statute. The court says in Evers v. Davis, supra, that "the implication
that proof of a breach of a public statute will support a private recovery is
positively misleading." 90 Atl. at 680.
7. Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925); Brown v. Shyne,

242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926); Grier v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d 485

(1949); Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936); Willett v. Rowekamp,
134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938).
8. See, e.g., Hardy v. Dahl, supra note 7.
9. Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270 (1927).
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Ordinarily, one not a party to a contract cannot maintain an action
for negligent performance of the contract. 10 This rule stems from the
old doctrine of privity, that one who is not a party to a contract, or in
privity with someone who is, cannot maintain an action on the con.
tract." In cases of suppliers of products the requirements of privity
were gradually relaxed by exceptions to the general rule,12 and the
death blow was dealt by the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. 1 3 Although inroads have also been made in cases of those
supplying services, 14 it is still the general rule that a third party cannot maintain an action based on negligence against an attorney for
failure properly to perform under a contract with his client. 15 The
privity rule finds an exception in a case where an attorney is guilty
of fraud or collusion with his client to the detriment of a third party, 6
but the basis of the action seems to be different. In one situation the
alleged liability is for negligently inflicted injury; in the other it is
for fraudulently inflicted injury.
Previous cases have held that a beneficiary under an invalid will
cannot bring an action based on negligence against the attorney who
drew the will. 17 In deciding that one acting as an attorney is liable
to a third party not privy to the attorney-client relationship, the
court in the instant case was forced to distinguish a prior decision of
its own jurisdiction which followed the more orthodox line of reason10. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Re Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L.
Rep. 3, 13 B.R.C. 146 (1923).
11. Ibid. See also, Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF.
L. REV. 39, 44 (1935). At least one court has indicated a possible exception to
this rule. Norwood v. Heaslett, 235 S.W.2d 955 (Ark. 1951).
12. See Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir.
1903), where three exceptions to the general rule of privity were recognized
at that date.
13. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14. Van Winkle v. American Steam Boiler Ins. Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl.
472 (1890) (defendant undertook to maintain and inspect a boiler which
exploded and injured the property of a third party); Jones v. Otis Elevator
Co., 231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949) (defendant contracted with plaintiff's
employer to maintain an elevator in repair, and in consequence of the negligent
performance of the work plaintiff was injured by falling down the elevator
shaft); Joost v. Craig, 131 Cal. 504, 63 Pac. 840 (1901) (notary public liable to
third party for negligence in his duties); see also, 39 AM. JuR., Notary Public
§§ 25, 27 (1942); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public
weighnian held liable to plaintiff, not a party to defendant's contract to
weigh, on basis of negligence when goods did not weigh as much as defendant
certified. In this case the fact that this plaintiff would depend on the certificate as furnished by the defendant was in contemplation of the parties at
the time they contracted); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931)
(city clerk furnishing false certificate showing no assessments due on real
property held liable for the assessment when he knew that third parties would
rely on the certificate); cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931) (public accountants held not liable for negligently preparing
numerous copies of a financial statement which they knew would be shown
to undetermined prospective lenders).
15. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
16. White v. Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S.W.2d 18 (1937); Adeliman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938). See also, Isaacs, supra note 11.
17. Re Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L. Rep. 3, 13 B.R.C. 146 (1923).
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ing and reached the opposite result. 18 The court justified its holding
simply by pointing out that to say the testator is the only party who
has been wronged by the negligence of the practitioner is "contrary
to fact and a legal fiction."'19 The decision is an indication that the
citadel of privity is being taken in the field of rendering legal services,
at least where the injured party was directly in the contemplation of
the parties at the time the services were rendered. The court also
decided in the affirmative the question, on which there is a striking
dearth of authority, of whether the unauthorized practice of law, in
violation of statute, is negligent conduct. The decision on this point,
though contrary to the result reached in other states in cases involving
the unlicensed practice of medicine, does not move contrary to any
established precedent as to unauthorized practice of law and seems
to be more in line with the decisions of the majority of states holding
that violation of a statute is negligence per se.
Persons who practice law without authority or engage in acts that
may be construed as such practice, should take warning from this
case, for they are acting at their peril. Absolute liability is placed on
the unauthorized practitioner for any mistake that may be incorporated in his work, for no matter how deeply concealed the defect
may lie his failure to draw an instrument validly, to the injury of
anyone, is negligence per se. This seems to be a policy decision designed to enforce the prohibition of the statute rather than to penalize
for careless conduct. However, it is a result reached on the basis of
sound principles and common sense rather than through questionable
judicial rationalization as is often the case in a policy decision. A
court cannot reach a just result if it does not recognize facts as they
are. The testator is not the loser under an invalid will because he is
dead when the invalidity of the will comes to light. The legatee
whose financial position is worse than it would have been had the will
been valid is the real loser, and it accords with just legal principles
that he who causes the loss should be required to make reparations.
18. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895). The facts in this case
were strikingly similar to those in the instant case. An attorney who negligently drew a will which had the effect of excluding an intended beneficiary
from taking under the will was not held liable to the intended beneficiary
either on the basis of negligence or third party beneficiary contract. In the
instant case the Buckley case was distinguished on the ground that there an
attorney drew the will, while here a layman did so. Having relied on this
distinction the court had to concede that the two decisions together create
an anomalous situation in the law of California. The court said, "Under our
interpretation of the law an injured legatee or devisee may recover damages
suffered by the negligent preparation of a will by an unlicensed person who
violates Business and Professions Code, § 6125, while under the Buckley
case a legatee similarly injured by the negligent practice of the law by a
licensed attorney may not recover. We simply point out that to say that only
the testator has been wronged is contrary to fact and a legal fiction." 310
P.2d at 68.
19. Ibid.
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Therefore, a two-fold objective is realized-the prohibition of the
statute is enforced and the injuries caused by violation of it by unauthorized practitioners are compensated.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-CHOICE OF LAW-APPLICATION
OF DRAMSHOP ACT WHERE INJURY OCCURS
IN ANOTHER STATE
In an action in a Minnesota court under the Minnesota Civil Damage
Act' plaintiff alleged that defendant illegally sold intoxicating liquors
to one Sorrenson, a resident of Minnesota, causing him to become
intoxicated in defendant's establishment in Minnesota; that shortly
thereafter, as a proximate result of defendant's illegal sale, plaintiffalso a resident of Minnesota-sustained injuries when an automobile
driven by Sorrenson in which plaintiff was a passenger overturned
near Prescptt, Wisconsin. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
that the law of the place of injury governed and since Wisconsin had
no civil damage act, the pleadings failed to state a claim against him.
The trial court granted defendant's motion, holding that the Minnesota statute did not provide for extraterritorial effect and no civil
action to collect the penalty arose where the illegal sale in the state
was followed by an injury in another state. On appeal, held, reversed.
The conflict of laws rule that in tort actions the law of the place of
injury governs does not apply in actions under the civil damage act
where all the parties were residents of Minnesota, where defendant
was licensed in that state and where the wrongful acts of defendant
for which he was liable under the Minnesota statute took place in
Minnesota. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 82 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1957).
In substance, civil damage or dramshop acts are designed to give
a right of action against a dealer to any party who is injured as a
result of intoxicants furnished by that dealer to any other person.2
They are remedial at least to the extent that they create a new right
of action and afford a remedy unknown to the common law. 3 Although
the acts also have a penal nature,4 the best analysis would seem to be
1. MN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1957).
2. See Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1957). See also Note, Liability Under the
New York Dram Shop Act, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 252 (1957); Comment, 51 Nw.
U. L. REV. 775 (1957); 1954 U. ILL. L. FORUM 503.
3. Noonan v. Galick, 19 Conn. Sup. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (Super. Ct. 1955) (dic-

tum); Izzler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1957) (dictum). See also 30 Am.

JUR., IntoxicatingLiquors § 607 (1940).
4. Lichter v. Scher, 11 Ill. App. 2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66 (1956); Kaminski v.
Rymek, 9 Ill. App. 2d 561, 133 N.E.2d 770 (1956); Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc.
2d 170, 152 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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that they are penal as to what and whom is covered, but remedial as
to damage and civil liability.5
A right founded on a tort committed in any jurisdiction will generally be enforced in every other jurisdiction unless such enforcement
is contrary to the positive law or the public policy of the forum. 6
The existence and the extent of such right, according to the prevailing
American view, will be determined by the law of the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place. 7 While this rule can be applied to torts involving physical damage with some degree of facility, other torts such as those involving
defamation or interference with privacy have been more difficult to
classify since injury may occur in a multitude of states simultaneously.8 Therefore, courts have sometimes used other conflict of laws
rules to aid their decision-making processes. 9 It can be seen that to
apply the normal rule-that the law of the place of injury governsto cases involving liability under civil damage acts would defeat the
purpose of the acts in many instances since only about fifteen states 10
have such acts and since there is no comparable liability on the dealer
at common law." Nevertheless, in two cases 12 prior to the instant
case, the court found no liability against a dealer within the dramshop
state when the injury complained of occurred in a non-dramshop
state. 13
5. This analysis would explain the apparent contradiction in decisions holding dramshop acts to be penal, see Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886
(1955), and those holding the acts to be remedial, see Arington v. Phelps, 79
F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Ill. 1948). See also 30 AM. JUR., Intoxicating Liquors §§
612-49 (1940) (semble).
6. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Reddin, 128 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1942)
(dictum). See also Paulsen and Sovern, "Public Policy" In The Conflict of
Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612
(1934).
7. This is the view adopted by the American Law Institute in RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78 (1934). See Cook, Tort Liability And The Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUm. L. REV. 202 (1935); Ehrenzweig, The Place Of Acting
in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1951); Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND.
L. REV. 447 (1953); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method
of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4 & 165 (1944).
8. As in the case of Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, Time, Inc., v. Hartmann, 334 U.S. 838 (1948).
9. Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), identifies nine solutions to the choice of law problem in multistate defamation. See
also Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 VicH. L. REV. 959 (1953); Note, 48
CoLuM. L. REV. 932 (1948).

10. For a listing of these states and a brief description of their statutes, see
Note, Construction of the Illinois Dram Shop Act Imposing Liability Upon
Tavernkeeper and His Lessor For Injuries Caused By Intoxicated Persons,
14 NOTRE DAME LAW 295, nn. 1-15 (1939).
11. See note 3 supra.
12. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512
(1950); Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun. 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. (1884).
13. The decisions were on the basis of giving an extraterritorial effect to
the civil damage acts, and the holding was, in the absence of specific provisions
in the act, no such effect would be given. That none of the dramshop acts
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A common law rule can be changed by a legislative enactment, 14
and had the Minnesota legislature expressly abrogated the conflict
of laws rule, there would be no problem here. However, in this case
the court acted on what it construed to be the intent of the Civil
Damage Act and, finding that intent to be impossible to achieve should
the common law rule be applied, refused to apply the rule.15 As the
court said, "[W]e feel that the situations presented ... here, do not
compel application of Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 377 and 378,
and that our determination that other principles apply will better
afford Minnesota citizens the protection which the Civil Damage Act
intended for them."'1 6 The situation is analogous to that which exists
in choice of law in criminal cases. 17 Under the common law the place
where a harmful impact first occurred was construed as being the
place of the crime and its law would govern. 18 However, since a state
may define a crime as it wants, where this general rule proves to be
too rigid it is not unusual for a state to attach legal consequences to
a local act which initiates a force causing harmful impact or injury
elsewhere.' 9 Since there is no doubt that a state may attach consequences to the conduct which produces an injury as well as to the
injury itself,20 there seems to be no reason why a state should not
impose liability for the doing of a prohibited act just because the
injury caused by that act occurred elsewhere.
The practice in American courts of adopting the lex locus delicti
rule to localize a multistate tort has the obvious advantages of ease
of application and uniformity of result; however, this stereotyping
of cases has also resulted in a lack of consideration for the interests at
stake in a particular case. It would seem that it is not the rule itself
which is at fault, but rather the dogmatic application of the rule
provide for such extraterritorial effect, see Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1128 n.

2

(1952). A proper question, it would seem, would concern the necessity of
determining this extraterritorial effect at all, since there were a number of
contacts with the legislating state although the injury itself occurred elsewhere. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 64-65 (1934); Comment,

Dram Shop Act Has No ExtraterritorialEffect, 1951 U. ILL. L. FORUM 343.
14. 15 C.J.S., Common Law § 12 (1939).
15. For a discussion of the elements to be considered by a court in determining if the intent of a statute is to be given effect, even in the face of a contrary common law rule, see Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 CoLum. L. REV. 959 (1952).
16. Instant case, 82 N.W.2d at 369.
17. Although reasoning by analogy may easily be misused, in this instance its
use may be justified if it is remembered that both Tort and Criminal Law
are based on the concept of a wrong done to a legally protected right. If
the right is that of a private person, the wrong is a tort; if the right is in
favor of the state, the wrong is a crime.
18. See State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
19. People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901); People v. Licenziata,
199 App. Div. 106, 191 N.Y. Supp. 619 (2d Dep't 1921). For a further discussion
of criminal cases as a background for multistate tort cases, see Leflar, supra
note 7.
20. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65, comment b (1934).
CONFLICT OF LAWS

185 (1951).

See STUMBERG,
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by courts in situations where adoption of another rule would result
in a more just decision. When the court is called on to decide between
two divergent approaches-as when a common law rule conflicts with
the intent of a statute-it must indulge in a delicate weighing process
before adopting one or the other. A common law rule is no less a
product of policy than is a statute, and the policy underlying a rule
should be carefully analyzed to determine its applicability to the
situation at hand. Rote application of a rule is not desirable, especially
in a situation where the results achieved by such application are questionable. Recognizing this, the court in the instant case concluded
that the interests intended to be protected by the statute required
deviation from the normal conflict of laws rule.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-LEGISLATIVE
PUBLICATION OF INTERCEPTED ATTORNEYCLIENT COMMUNICATION
Plaintiff, while incarcerated in county jail for alleged parol violation, conferred privately with his attorney. Unknown to either party,
this conversation was surreptitiously recorded by a concealed electronic device. Plaintiff sought to restrain defendant legislative commitee from publicly disclosing a copy of the recording which had
come into its hands. The trial court granted an injunction pendente
lite.' On plaintiff's appeal from the Appellate Division's reversal dismissing the complaint,2 held (4-3), affirmed. The court is powerless
to enjoin the legislature's use of a recording, which falls within its
legitimate legislative objective, particularly since such use violates
neither the testimonial privilege of attorney-client communications
nor the client's constitutional right to fair trial, there being no trial,
present or prospective. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772
(1957), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. Week 3127 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1957) (No.
377).
The fundamental quality of each individual's right to a fair trial 3
has been zealously affirmed by the courts in numerous criminal cases
wherein defendant has shown an impairment of his free and effective
assistance of counsel. 4 Impairment of this right has not been made
1. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm. on Governmental

Operations, 5 Misc. 2d 324, 164 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
2. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm. on Governmental

Operations, 3 App. Div. 2d 531, 162 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1957).

3. N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
4. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Caldwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y.
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contingent upon its denial resulting in demonstrable prejudice. 5 Such
denial may be through a disclosure of privileged confidential communications between a client and his attorney. 6 This attorney-client privilege manifests the long standing policy of promoting freedom of
consultation with legal advisors by removing all apprehension of compelled disclosure by attorneys. 7 Traditionally, however, this protection
has not been extended to situations in which third persons have overheard the conversation or surreptitiously intercepted it.8 Moreover,
the privilege is not guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 9 but
exists as a mere rule of evidence, applied and modified at the state
legislature's discretion. 10 Thus, in New York it is further limited to
testimonial compulsion within a trial or examination."
In the instant case, the assertions of denial of due process through
violation of the attorney-client privilege are unique; for rather than
as defenses within a criminal prosecution, plaintiff urges threatened
infringement of such rights as a basis for injunctive relief. Before
holding itself powerless to grant such a drastic remedy against a
coordinate governmental branch, 12 the court concludes that the absence of a judicial proceeding necessarily negatives any impairment
424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d
356 (1944).

5. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952). See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942),
where it is stated: "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
6. "The prosecution is not entitled to have a representative present to
hear the conversations of accused and counsel." Coplon v. United States, 191
F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also cases cited note 4 supra.
7. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940).

8. Cary v. White, 59 N.Y. 336 (1874); Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244,
104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1951). "Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands . . . it would be improper
to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2326 (3d ed. 1940). (Emphasis added.)
Perhaps the failure of Wigmore's rationale in situations wherein clients have
no control over the place for conversing (e.g., prison consultation rooms)
prompted the clause in the UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 26, which
would exclude evidence "if it came to the knowledge of such witness . . .in
a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client."
9. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
10. 97 C.J.S., Witnesses § 276 (1957).
11. See N.Y. Civ. Prec.ACT. §§ 353-54.
12. "[T]he universal rule ... is that the legislative discretion in discharge
of its constitutional functions, whether rightfully or wrongfully exercised,
is not a subject for judicial interference." Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71
(D.C. Cir. 1936). See also Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843. (1948). But see Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957), decided only twenty-four days after the instant case:
"We cannot simply assume . . . that every congressional investigation is
justified by a public need that overbalances any private rights affected.
To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution
upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach
upon an individual's right[s]...."
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of his asserted rights under the controlling statutes. 13 In effect the
court implied that without a criminal prosecution, plaintiff has no
rights subject to impingement by defendants. 14
This decision seems to go off on technical niceties undeserved by
the fundamental principles thereby affected. 15 To imply that plaintiff's rights begin and end within a proceeding is to ignore the substantive facet of due process as encompassed in an expanded concept
of "liberty."'16 Furthermore, the basic policy surrounding the attorney-client privilege 7 is jeopardized to the extent that prisoners
can no longer feel secure in making full disclosures to counsel. 18
An increasing concern over law enforcement officers' eavesdropping
by means of various modern electronic devices was reflected recently
in the restrictive proposals of another New York legislative committee. 19 However, objections from district attorneys resulted in a
13. See notes 3, 10 supra.
14. But the court recognizes that the act of recording "was an unreasonable
interference with Lanza's right to confer privately with counsel." 143 N.E.2d
at 775. (Emphasis added.) This statement is difficult to reconcile with the
court's subsequent conclusion that such right ripens only within a proceeding
directed against Lanza.
15. See note 4 supra.
16. "The liberty mentioned in that [Fourteenth] amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties. .. ." Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). For a thorough treatment of the development of "liberty," see Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REV. 431 (1926).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. Statements quoted in news reports corroborate the effect of the instant
case on prisoners' reticence to converse freely with counsel: "Jail officials
were quoted . . . as saying 'all ten of the visitors' booths are bugged and
there is a hidden mike in one of the eight interview rooms used by lawyers
*

.'"

N.Y. Post, Oct. 27, 1957, p. 38, col. 4. Indeed, one judge has found it

necessary to release a prisoner in order to afford privacy for consultations:
"Later, Judge Mullen said:
'I became convinced by what was said by counsel that there was a necessity
of permitting the defendants outside the Tombs for the purpose of free consultations.
'... I have an idea that the recent problem that has arisen through somebody putting a tape recording machine in these places leads counsel to believe
every one of these places is tape-recorded.'" N.Y. Times, June 26, 1957, p. 64,
col. 1.
19. For a detailed report of this committee's activity outlining the measures
proposed and the compromises necessary for enactment, see REPORT OF THE

N w YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (1957).
In commenting on the instant case, the

committee chairman observed: "Under our proposed legislation, as vetoed,
such eavesdropping would be legal only under authority of a court order,
on application of police or prosecutor, who might be expected to cooperate
with the Parole Board in the public interest." Id. at 10. In urging these proposals the committee explained: "This bill would make any evidence inadmissible in any proceedings in this State, if obtained through illegal eavesdropping... . Its principle has been endorsed by the New York State Bar
Association; and . . . by the Bill of Rights committees of leading bar associations. . . . Its purpose is to make eavesdropping unprofitable as well as
illegal." Id. at 17.
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veto of these measures. 20 That one governmental agency can sanctimoniously promulgate, to a citizen's detriment, the results of a
coordinate agency's wrongful act would seem to present a possibility
that appeals for careful legislation. Moreover, the New York court's
claimed impotency to enjoin legislative activity has no application to
the United States Supreme Court,21 whose discretion in construing
constitutional rights should facilitate the prevention of such a subterfuge. Finally, it seems strongly arguable that defendant committee already has in its hands all the information concerning plaintiff which
can possibly be used to aid future legislation, and that none of its
legitimate investigatory or remedial functions can be furthered by
broadcasting to the public this confidential material.

CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS' RIGHTS-MANDAMUS
TO COMPEL INSPECTION OF CORPORATE BOOKS
AT PLACE OUTSIDE FORUM STATE
Plaintiff stockholder sought mandamus in a Minnesota state court
to compel defendant, a foreign corporation domiciled in Delaware, to
allow him to inspect its books and records' located in Washington,
the corporation's principal place of business. From a judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering that its books and
records be made available for inspection in Washington, defendant
corporation appealed to the Minnesota supreme court. Held, affirmed.
It is not an abuse of discretion to order a foreign corporation to make
its books and records available for inspection by a stockholder at its
principal place of business even though the place at which such books
and records are kept is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 84 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1957).
It is well recognized at common law that a shareholder has the right
20. See N.Y. Civ. PR~c. ACT § 345-a (Supp. 1957), for the codification of
the accepted proposals. See also Chairman Savarese's persevering convictions
that "eavesdropping by secret microphone cannot be morally distinguished
from eavesdropping by wiretap. Its use by public officials should be brought
under court control, as wiretapping is. In next year's legislative session a
bill will be introduced for this single simple purpose ....
When this issue is
presented thus simply, without complicating factors, I trust it will receive
Governor Harriman's approval." REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 11
(1957).
21. Neither the state nor any of its branches is immune from the process
of the United States Supreme Court. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S.
565 (1918).
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.32 (1945), setting out the stockholder's right to
inspect corporate books and records, was cited by the court as legislative recognition of the common law right. 84 N.W.2d at 921. The court assumed that
plaintiff's right to inspect was based on common law. Neither Delaware nor
Washington statutes on the subject are cited.
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to inspect the books and records of a corporation at a proper time and
place 2 if the request is made in good faith and for a specific and proper
purpose. 3 Some statutes in the various states granting stockholders
the right to inspect books and records have been merely declaratory
of the common law while others have enlarged and extended the
common law right to inspect.4 Still other statutes indicate that only
a qualified right to inspect the books and records of a corporation is
granted.5 Regardless of the extent of either the common law or statutory right of inspection, the right will be compelled by writ of mandamus. 6 It is clear that the remedy of mandamus will be granted
where the stockholder is seeking to inspect books and records of a
foreign corporation doing business within the state as long as the
books are located within the forum state.7 If the books are not within
the state the courts will usually require the foreign corporation to
bring its books within the state for inspection,8 although there have
been decisions to the contrary. 9
The question considered in the instant case is the extent of discretionary authority to issue mandamus to compel the corporation to
allow the inspection of its books by a stockholder at an office outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Usually a court will refuse to
2. "There can be no question that the decisive weight of American authority

recognizes the common law right of the shareholder, for proper purposes
under reasonable regulations as to place and time to inspect the books of
corporation of which he is a member . . . ." Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S.
153 (1905). See also Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner, 40 Del. (1 Terry)

and
the
148,
105,

5 A.2d 519 (1939); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 159 (rev. ed. 1946); 5 FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2213-26 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 108 (rev. ed. 1949); Annots., 174 A.L.R. 262 (1948), 80 A.L.R.

1502 (1932).
3. Kemp v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 128 N.J.L. 322, 26 A.2d 70 (Sup.
Ct. 1942). For an exhaustive survey as to what constitutes a proper purpose
for inspection of corporate books, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951).
4. 5 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2215-.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).

Statutes of the several states should be consulted. For a representative statute
see TENN.CODE ANN.§ 48-308 (1956).
5. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 12:38 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. 21.45 (1931).

Both statutes limit the right of inspection to stockholders who hold at least 2%
of all the outstanding shares, and the stockholders must have owned the
stock for a certain length of time before any action is brought for inspection.
See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 161 (rev. ed. 1946).

6. Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941); Doggett
v. North American Life Ins. Co., 396 Ill. 354, 71 N.E.2d 686 (1947); Durr v.
Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967, aff'g 246 App. Div. 579, 284
N.Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 1936).
7. Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321 (Sup.
Ct.) aff'd, 233 App. Div. 708, 249 N.Y. Supp. 993 (1st Dep't 1931); 5 FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2243 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952); 31 ILL. L. REV. 677

(1937). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R. 1383, 1399 (1922).
8. State ex rel. Lindsay v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 23 Del. (7 Penn.)
397, 72 Atl. 1057 (1909); Self v. Langley Mills, 123 S.C. 179, 115 S.E. 754
(1923). Some state statutes expressly provide that the court may order a
foreign corporation to bring its books within the state for inspection. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:5-2 (1937) (enforceable in equity).
9. Mitchell v. Northern Security Oil & Transp. Co., 44 Misc. 514, 90 N.Y.
Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct.) afffd 99 App. Div. 624, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1104 (1st Dep't 1904).
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exercise its jurisdiction to order an act to be done in another state.'0
However, such jurisdiction is exercised when it will promote convenience, economy and justice between the parties." In the instant
case the court had no difficulty in determining that the inspection of
the corporate books in Washington was the most obvious method of
accomplishing justice with economy and convenience, especially in
view of the fact that the plaintiff was willing to go to Washington to
inspect them. The two grounds of opposition most often raised to a
decree requiring inspection of the books of a foreign corporation are
(1) the difficulty of enforcing the order in another jurisdiction and
(2) the notion that such a decree is judicial interference in the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Commenting upon the first
objection, the Minnesota court cited two cases 2 in which the courts
ordered inspection of the books of two foreign corporations whose
books were located in Mexico and Canada. The Minnesota court
apparently reasoned that if books of a foreign corporation could be
inspected in a foreign country, in the instant case the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant corporation to allow
plaintiff to inspect corporate books in another state. The court hinted
strongly that if defendant corporation refused to allow the inspection
in Washington, the defendant might be subject to punishment for
contempt by the Minnesota court. 13 Concerning the second objection,
the court held that to order inspection of foreign corporate books was
not unauthorized judicial interference in the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation. To enforce the order for inspection, it is not
necessary for the court to investigate the affairs of the corporation, nor
does the order affect the management of the business, or the relations
of stockholders to one another. 14
Assuming there is a proper purpose for inspection of books, there
seems to be no good reason for denying mandamus to force a foreign
corporation to produce its books for inspection in another state. The
court is reasonably justified in assuming that under the policy of
10. Port Royal Ry. v. Hammond, 58 Ga. 523 (1877); Gunter v. Arlington
Mills, 271 Mass. 314, 171 N.E. 486 (1930). See also cases collected in 16

IOWA L. REv. 277 (1931).

11. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898
(Sup. Ct. 1936) (New York court required corporation to bring back machinery

from Pennsylvania where it had been sent in violation of an agreement with
a labor union). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 94, comment b (1934);
Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the
Doing of Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REv. 494

(1930).

12. SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (Arizona corporation ordered to allow inspection of its books in Mexico.); Independent Order
of Foresters v. Scott, 223 Iowa 105, 272 N.W. 68 (1936) (Canadian corporation
ordered to allow inspection of its books in Canada for an accounting.)
13. See MINiN. STAT. ANN. § 588.01 (1945) (constructive contempt); id. §
303.18 (punitive action against foreign corporations).
14. Andrews v. Mines Corp., 205 Mass. 121, 91 N.E. 122 (1910); State ex rel.
Herman v. Goodsell, 149 Wash. 143, 270 Pac. 297 (1928).
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comity the courts of a sister state (here Washington) would defer to
its order. There seems to be ample authority to support the court's
decision, 15 and in the final analysis the exericse of the court's discretion
in granting mandamus for inspection will be based upon what is the
most practical and convenient method of safeguarding the interests of
all concerned.

CREDITORS' RIGHTS-FEDERAL TAX LIENS-REMOVAL OF
LIEN FROM PROPERTY IN HANDS OF
BONAFIDE PURCHASER
In 1953 the federal tax collector received assessment lists which
fixed the date of the Government's tax lien upon the taxpayer's property.1 Between May 1, 1953, and April 7, 1954, notices of federal tax
lien were filed for record. In 1952 a valid first mortgage deed of trust
had been recorded against the taxpayer's property. The mortgage
contained a power of sale valid under state law, and in May of 1956
the mortgagee began foreclosure proceedings. The mortgagee sold
the property at the foreclosure sale on June 22, 1956, and paid the
balance of $739.41 into the court registry after deducting the mortgage
principal, interest and all charges. The federal government was not
a party to this action. 2 It had taken no further action upon its tax
lien until May 28, 1956, when it instituted an action under section 7403,
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,3 seeking foreclosure. The mortgagee
15. See, e.g., Ruby v. Penn Fiber Board Corp., 326 Pa. 582, 192 Atl. 914
(1937) (court refused to order a Pennsylvania corporation to bring its books
from New York to Pennsylvania but required the corporation to allow stockholder to inspect the books at the corporation's New York office).
1. See note 8 infra.
2. "By the great weight of authority, a junior mortgagee or encumbrancer
is not a necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a real-estate mortgage, so
far as concerns the jurisdiction of the court to render a decree of foreclosure
binding on all the parties to the proceeding; he is, however, a necessary party
in order to foreclose and bar any right of redemption he has in the property
by virtue of his lien, and is not affected by a judgment or decree foreclosing
the mortgage if he is not made a party." 37 Am. Jur., Mortgages § 552 (1941).
In the instant case the court held that it was not necessary to determine if the
state law (Mississippi) required making the Government a party to the power
of sale proceeding as the Government had "actual notice" of such proceeding.
United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1957).
3. "ACTION TO ENFORCE LIEN OR TO SUBJECT PROPERTY TO PAYMENT OF TAX. (a) FmnI.-In any case where there has been a refusal or
neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether
or not levy has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the
request of the Secretary or his delegate, may direct a civil action to be filed
in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States
under this title with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property,
of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title,
or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability. (b) PaRnE.-All persons
having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved in such
action shall be made parties thereto. (c) ADJUDICATION AND DECaEE.-The
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was made a party and set out the previous foreclosure in answer to
the government's suit. The Government conceded that the mortgage
lien had priority, but contended that the previous foreclosure did not
bar this proceeding. The district court decreed that the Government's
liens were paramount to all others except that of the mortgagee and
that the Government could redeem the property within the one year
statutory period provided by 28 U.S.C., section 2410 (c).4 The Government appealed on the ground that the court erred in not decreeing
a resale of the property. Held, affirmed. Although section 7403 provides that a court may decree a sale of property in foreclosing a federal tax lien, the court, in its discretion, may 5 deny that remedy where,
because the property had already been sold under a power of sale
in a prior mortgage, a decree of resale would be neither appropriate
nor effective. United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1957).
A federal tax lien is created simply by the making of an assessment
and demand by the collector. 6 However, it may not take effect in
certain instances until notice thereof has been filed.7 Although a federal tax lien is relatively simple to create, it is a more difficult matter
to remove it. Once the lien has attached it will remain in effect until
the liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse
court shall, after the parties have been duly notified of the action, proceed to
adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally determine the merits of all
claims to and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or
interest of the United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such
property, by the proper officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds
of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests
of the parties and of the United States." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7403.
4. "Actions affecting property on which the United States has a lien ....
(c). . .Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien prior to that of
the United States, the United States shall have one year from the date of sale
within which to redeem. . .

."

28 U.S.C. § 2410 (c)

(1952).

5. Originally the statute read "shall decree a sale," (emphasis added), however in 1936 Congress amended it to read "may decree a sale." (emphasis
added.) Revenue Act of 1926, § 1127, 44 STAT. 123, as amended by Revenue Act
of 1936, § 802, 49 STAT. 1743.

(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7403).

6. "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, or assessible penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.

7. "(a) INVALIDITY OF LIEN WITHOUT NOTICE.-Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (c), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid
as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice
thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate(1) UNDER STATE OR TERRITORIAL LAWS.-In the office designated
by the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject to the
lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law designated an
office within the State or Territory for the filing of such notice; or
(2) WITH CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT.-In the office of the clerk of the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the property
subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has not by law
designated an office within the State or Territory for the filing of such
notice .... ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
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of time.8 The lien may be extinguished in whole or in part by a release or partial discharge of the taxpayer's property. 9 Once the federal tax lien is established it cannot be negated by state laws which
would give a special priority to local liens arising after the tax lien
has attached.10 Section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a
method of removal through a civil action brought either by the Government or, under certain circumstances, by a subsequent purchaser."
At the present time a bona fide purchaser takes subject to the tax
lien only if it is recorded.' 2 A recorded federal tax lien has been
held to remain in effect against property in the hands of a subsequent
purchaser where the tax lien was junior to the valid mortgage under
8. PERIOD OF LIEN. Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the
lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made
and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied
or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 6322. Under normal conditions the government has a 9-year statutory period
in which to initiate collection proceedings.
"LIMITATIONS ON ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION. (a) GENERAL
RuLE.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed
(whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if
the taxes payable by stamp, within 3 years after such tax became due, and
no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall
be begun after the expiration of such period." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.
"COLLECTION AFTER ASSESSMENT. (a) LENGTH OF PERIOD.-Where
the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been made within the
period of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may be collected
by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun-(1) within 6 years after the assessment of the tax, or (2) prior
to the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing by the
Secretary or his delegate and the taxpayer before the expiration of such 6-year
period ....INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6502. There are exceptions to these rules
such as where the taxpayer files a false return, does not file a return, makes
a wilful attempt to evade the tax or there is a waiver agreement.
9. RELEASE OF LIEN OR PARTIAL DISCHARGE OF PROPERTY. (a)
RELEASE OF LIEN.-Subject to such rules or regulations as the Secretary or his
delegate may prescribe, the Secretary or his delegate may issue a certificate
of release of any lien imposed with respect to any internal revenue tax if-

(1) LIABILITY Is SATISFIED OR UNENFORCEABLE. ...
(2) BOND ACCEPTED....
(b) PARTIAL DISCHARGE OF PROPERTY.-(1) PROPERTY DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF
THE LIABILITY.... (2) PART PAYMENT OR INTEREST OF UNITED STATES VALUELESS ....
(C) EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR PARTIAL DIsCHARGE.-A

certificate of release or of partial discharge issued under this section shall be

held conclusive that the lien upon the property covered by the certificate is
extinguished." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6325.
10. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, rehearing denied,
351 U.S. 958 (1956); Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943); United
States v.Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941). But see United States v.
Vorreiter, 307 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1957).
11. See note 16 infra.
12. In United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893), the Supreme Court held
that property in the hands of a bona fide purchaser was subject to an unrecorded government tax lien. However this result was changed by Congress.
37 STAT. 1016, § 166 (1913) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323). The protection
thus afforded was, however, limited to mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and
judgment creditors. The result has been an effort by all types of creditors to
place themselves within one of these categories. There has also been litigation
concerned with the problem of whether the recording was in accordance with
the statute.
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which the purchaser acquired the property. 3 Such a purchaser can
bring an action under section 7424 of the Internal Revenue Code to
obtain a clear title, but the procedure is cumbersome and time consuming.14 Moreover, previous cases have held that even in a civil action
the only way the Government tax lien can be removed is through a
resale of the property. 15
The predecessor of section 7403 originally provided that in actions
to remove a federal tax lien the court "shall decree a sale" of the
property. (Emphasis added.)1 6 In MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. United
States,'7 the sixth circuit reasoned that it had no discretion in the
matter and ordered a resale of the property involved. In 1936 Congress
amended it to read "may decree a sale." (Emphasis added.)18 In 1948,
the Third Circuit,19 despite the change in the statute, followed the
Metropolitan decision without even noting the change. These two
decisions are the ones largely relied on by the Government in the
instant case to support its position. This court reasoned that it had
discretion in the matter and that the statute did not compel it to
order a resale of the property. Proceeding on the premise that the
13. United States v. Kensington Shipyards &Drydock Co., 169 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.
1948); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir.

1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940); Integrity Trust Co. v. United States,
3 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.J. 1933); Sherwood v. United States, 5 F.2d 991 (E.D.N.Y.
1925). In the following cases it was held that the tax lien was extinguished
as to the property involved because the value was such that the original sale
did not satisfy prior claimants' liens and a resale would not net the government
anything. Miners Savings Bank v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 563 (M.D. Pa.
1953); Trust Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 683 (S.D. Tex. 1933); Minnesota
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 47 F.2d 942 (N.D. Tex. 1931); Oden v.
United States, 33 F.2d 553 (W.D. Iowa 1929).
14. Under the provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7424, the purchaser
must first request the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize filing of a civil
action under § 7403. The Secretary has six months to initiate an action or
refuse to do so. If he so refuses the purchaser may then file in a district court
for permission to bring such action himself. After a full hearing in open
court the district court may grant leave to file such a civil action. If such
leave is granted the matters therein would then by adjudicated in the same
manner as if the government had instituted the suit.
15. United States v. Kensington Shipyards & Drydock Co., 169 F.2d 9 (3d
Cir. 1948); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir.
1939).
16. Revenue Act of 1926, § 1127, 44 STAT. 123, as amended by Revenue Act
of 1936, § 802, 49 STAT. 1743. (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7403). The action
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939)
was begun in March of 1936 and the statute was amended in June of 1936.
Despite this change the Sixth Circuit held that it was powerless to do anything but order a resale of the property. The case has come in for a considerable amount of criticism. See, e.g., Note, 49 YALz L.Jf. 1106 (1940); 53 HARv.
L. RE.V. 888 (1940). It should also be pointed out, however that even prior to
the change in the statute, there had been some courts which did not follow it.
See, e.g., Trust Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 683 (S.D. Tex. 1933); Minnesota
Mutual States,
Life Ins.
Co. v.
47 F.2d 942 (N.D. Tex. 1931); Oden v.
United
33 F.2d
553United
(W.D. States,
La. 1929).

17. 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939).
18. See note 5 supra.

19. United States v. Kensington Shipyards & Drydock Co., 169 F.2d 9 (3d

Cir. 1948).
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statute gave it discretionary power to act in the matter, the court
found that to decree a resale would upset standard business practices
which are essential to effectual enforcement of security rights by
creditors. The court also determined that this action was really one
to determine the priority of the government lien, rather than one to
extinguish a lien.20 The court concluded that in any event the Government's rights were still protected if it desired to redeem the property within the one year statutory period provided by 28 U.S.C., section 2410 (c).21

It is to be realized, of course, that the ability of a sovereign to enforce and collect the tax necessary for its operations should be
unhampered. However, third parties with interests in the property of
a delinquent taxpayer should be protected also. If the Government's
argument were to be upheld a vast amount of every-day credit transactions might soon cease, as it is unlikely that an individual or a firm
would risk a transaction whereby it could have its rights impaired
merely by a tax lien attaching to the debtor's property. Also, other
problems may arise when a resale is ordered: Who would reimburse
the first purchaser if on second sale the property brought less? What
basis would be used to compel the mortgagee to return the consideration obtained on such first sale? The result reached in this case, which
would limit the Government's power to curtail third party interests in
a delinquent taxpayer's property, seems just and equitable.

CRIMINAL LAW-PERJURY--WITNESS BROUGHT BEFORE
GRAND JURY FOR PRIMARY PURPOSE OF
EXTRACTING PERJURED TESTIMONY
A federal grand jury in Nebraska conducted an investigation to
determine whether the defendant and other government employees
had entered into a conspiracy to hinder an investigation of alleged
corruption in the St. Louis, Missouri office of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. Jurisdiction over the offense was based upon a notation on
a letter referring to the offense and written in Nebraska. This letter
was never made part of the record nor were the notations made on it
shown with any degree of clarity. Defendant was ordered into Nebraska on an undisclosed mission whereupon he was immediately
taken before the grand jury and interrogated. On the basis of his
testimony defendant was convicted of perjury. On appeal, held,
20. In the instant case the court felt that the Sixth Circuit had based its
decision in the Metropolitan case on the premise that the action was one to
extinguish a lien rather than one to determine if a lien existed, had been
extinguished or was inferior in rank.
21. See note 4 supra.
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reversed. Where a witness is brought before a grand jury for the
primary purpose of extracting perjured testimony1 from him and not
for the purpose of obtaining any evidence upon which it could find a
true bill against anyone for any offense committed in its jurisdiction,
such testimony, even if false, could not amount to perjury. Brown v.
United States, 245 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
The grand jury has long been an essential part of the federal judicial
system,2 yet it is difficult to find a precise definition of its powers.
There is no definition in the federal statutes 3 nor has Congress seen
4
fit to define its powers or to designate any exact limitations upon it.
It has remained for the courts to determine for themselves on each
set of facts and circumstances just how far a grand jury may go. 5 The
Federal Constitution 6 gives the grand jury power to present7 and
indict and the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has held that
the scope of its investigatory power is virtually unlimited.8 A grand
jury may investigate matters before it has been demonstrated that
the court to which it is an appendage will have jurisdiction over the
offense. 9 However, when a grand jury investigates an offense for
which no true bill could be returned against anyone in the district
in which it sits, it has acted beyond its power as its jurisdiction cannot
exceed that of the court. 10
The court in the instant case reversed a conviction for perjury based
upon false testimony given before a grand jury. Although perjury
12
may be founded on such testimony 1 if it Telates to a material issue,
the court found that the grand jury was not acting within its competency since it had exceeded its jurisdiction and power. It exceeded
its jurisdiction by investigating an offense for which it could not have
returned a true bill against anyone for a crime committed in Nebraska.
It exceeded its power by extracting testimony from a witness for the
1. Prior to this grand jury investigation defendant and three other parties
had made sworn statements concerning their recollection of the circumstances
surrounding the matter being investigated. From these statements the prosecutor knew that the defendant's testimony would differ from that given by
the other witnesses.
2. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, No. 18255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872).
3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1952).

4. Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
5. Ibid.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

7. "The word 'presentment' technically characterizes the process whereby
a grand jury initiates an independent investigation and asks that a charge be
drawn to cover the facts should they constitute a crime." United States v.
Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 295 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
8. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
9. Application of Linen Supply Cos., 15 F.R.D. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
10. Application of United Electrical Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
11. 2 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAw § 1527 (12th ed. 1932).
12. United States v. Rose, 113 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
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sole purpose of prosecuting him for perjury. To support its position in
holding that such a purpose is beyond the realm of a grand jury's
power the court extended to grand jury investigations the principle
applied to congressional subcommittee hearings in United States v.
Icardi.13 The court held that testimony so taken cannot amount to
perjury or be made the basis of prosecution therefor, even if false.
This court, confronted with a case of first impression, has exercised
its power to control and limit the broad investigatory powers of a
federal grand jury. The court wisely restrained the government
prosecutor's attempt to provide a nexus between the situs of the
offense and the jurisdiction of the court through evidence which could
not be produced or substantiated. The prosecutor's maneuver came
very close to an attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon the jurisdiction of
the court. By extending the rule of the Icardi case to a case involving
a federal grand jury the court has further limited the powers of the
grand jury. Perhaps this case conveys the message that although the
courts do not want to tie the hands of the grand jury nor impede its
functions, they also do not want citizens to be subjected to prosecution
by answering questions propounded for the primary purpose of exposure.

-DOMESTIC RELATIONS-TORTS-ACTION BY HUSBAND
AGAINST WIFE FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
PERSONAL INJURIES
Plaintiff, while driving a truck, collided with an auto driven by his
wife. He brought a negligence action against his wife, alleging that
she was driving on the wrong side of the road at an excessive rate of
speed. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and
dismissed the action on the basis of the common law rule that neither
spouse can maintain a personal tort action against the other. On appeal, held, reversed. Under the emancipation statute providing that
a married woman may sue and be sued, a husband may recover from
his wife for personal injuries occasioned by her negligence. Leach v.
Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957).
At common law the wife's legal identity was said to be merged with
that of her husband with the result that she could not sue or be
13. 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956). The court held that where a congressional subcommittee already had in its possession sufficient information on
which to base its report, including prior statements of the witness, and the
purpose of asking witness to appear was to give him an opportunity to tell
his side of the story or so that he could be indicted for perjury, the subcommittee was not functioning as a competent tribunal, and the witness was
not subject to prosecution for alleged false testimony given.
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sued without the joinder of her husband.' Therefore, at common
law neither spouse could maintain a tort action against the other,
for the husband would be plaintiff and defendant in the same action.
Since the advent of the emancipation statutes, the joinder of the husband is no longer necessary,2 and to that extent the identity theory of
the common law no longer exists. As a result, most courts now allow
tort actions between spouses for injury to property. 3 A substantial
minority of courts also allow the wife to maintain a personal injury
action against the husband, 4 although the majority of jurisdictions still
adhere to interspousal immunity in such actions.5 These latter courts
now justify their position on the basis of the interests of society in
the maintenance of family harmony 6 and in discouraging baseless and
collusive claims against insurance companies.7 On the other hand,
the courts following the minority view usually point out that society
should insure adequate redress to the injured wife, particularly when
the family harmony has already been disrupted.8
The converse situation, that of the husband suing the wife for
1. Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215 (1870); Smith v. City of St. Joseph, 55
Mo. 456, 17 Am. Rep. 660 (1874); MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS

220 (1931).
2. For a typical example of an Emancipation statute, see TENN. CODE ANN.

§

36-601(1956):

'"Married women . . . shall have the same capacity . . . to

sue and be sued with all the rights and incidents thereof, as if she were not
married." This statute has been construed, however, not to extinguish the
common law doctrine that one spouse could not sue the other for a personal
injury, based on family harmony. Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d
263 (1932). In an earlier decision, Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179
S.W. 628 (1915), the court said that since personal tort actions were not expressly authorized by the statute, their authorization is not necessarily implied.
3. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N.W. 598 (1908) (trover);
Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1870) (ejectment).
4. There are now approximately 14 jurisdictions which allow the wife to
sue the husband in a personal tort action. PROSSER, TORTS, § 101 (2d ed.
1955). In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), the majority of the
Court held that a spouse could not recover from the other in a personal injury
action. It seems, however, that many of the above mentioned states have
followed the reasoning of Justice Harlan in his now famous dissent in the
Thompson case, in which he felt that a statute which gave a married woman
the right to sue and be sued, as if she were unmarried, was so definite as
not to require any construction by the court, and he felt that the majority
of the court was putting itself in the anomalous position of allowing a married
woman to sue her husband in tort for damages to her property, but not
allowing a suit for brutal injuries to her person, thus defeating the clearly
expressed will of Congress.
5. Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952); Corren v. Corren, 47
So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933);
Tobin v. Gelrich, 162 Tenn. 96, 34 S.W.2d 1058 (1931).
6. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill.
App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507 (1952) (wife not allowed to recover because of the
interest of the public in preserving domestic peace and felicity); Morgan
v. Lueck, 137 W. Va. 546, 72 S.E.2d 825 (1952) (to permit recovery would
disturb the tranquility of marital relations).
7. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936); Harvey v. Harvey,
239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927).
8. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Brown v. Gosser,
262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
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personal injuries has apparently arisen only twice prior to the instant
case, and in each instance the husband was not allowed to recover.0
The problem in the principal case was regarded by the court as being
primarily one of statutory construction, i.e., the effect of the married
women's emancipation act on the common law doctrine of interspousal
immunity. On prior occasions the court had construed the statute so
as to allow the wife to sue the husband. 10 Since the statute was couched
in such broad language providing that a married woman may sue and
be sued, the court reasoned that it also rendered the wife amenable
to suit by the husband. To lend support to its conclusion, the court
used the theory that once a tort has occurred there is no domestic
tranquility to preserve."
The primary purpose of the emancipation acts was to remove from
married women the disability of coverture and to endow them with
a legal personality of their own, separate and distinct from that of
their husband.'2 These acts provide, inter alia, that a married woman
may enter into her own contracts and sue in her own name,13 and
many of the statutes also allow her to be sued. 14 This legislation is
obviously aimed at the archaic common law notion that husband and
wife are one and the husband is that one. But it may be seriously
doubted whether the acts were intended to have the further effect of
destroying interspousal immunity in personal tort actions. As already
noted, this doctrine of immunity is no longer a part of the common
law theory that the husband and wife are one, but rather is based
upon important social considerations. However, when the action arises
from an intentional tort, family harmony may already have been
destroyed; society's interest in granting adequate redress to the injured spouse would then seem to be the controlling consideration. In
such cases, it is not the emancipation act which allows interspousal
immunity to be circumvented but rather the nature of the act itself.
On the other hand, when the action is based on a negligent tort, family
harmony has not ordinarily been disrupted and in the absence of
liability insurance, the immunity doctrine should be followed and
recovery denied. 15 If the parties are insured, it is suggested that the
9. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v. General Acc., Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
The North Carolina and Wisconsin courts both allow the wife to sue the
husband, but they refused to let the husband sue the wife, on the theory that
the emancipation acts were meant to affect only married women and did
not confer any additional rights on married men.
10. Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Fitz-

patrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916).
11. PROSSER, TORTS, § 101 (2d ed. 1955).

12. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 220-22
13. MINN. STAT. ANN., § 519.01 (1947).

(1931).

14. ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1936); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW, § 57,
15. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030 (1930); Sanford, Personal Torts Within The Family, 9 VAND. L.
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insurance company should be made to bear the loss. Even though
a certain amount of collusion may result, the courts are capable of
separating the valid claims from those that are fraudulent; furthermore, the insurance companies can fully protect themselves by adjusting the premium rates. 16

EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
CHARACTER WITNESS FOR ACCUSED AS TO HIS
KNOWLEDGE OF ACCUSED'S CLAIM OF THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Defendant was prosecuted for filing false noncommunist union
officer affidavits. Though defendant did not take the stand, four persons were called in his behalf as witnesses to his character for truth
and veracity. On cross-examination these witnesses were asked, over
the objection of the defendant, whether they had heard that defendant
had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination before a Senate
investigating subcommittee. A verdict and judgment of conviction
followed and defendant appealed. Held, reversed. Since cross-examination as to character witness' knowledge of defendant's claim of
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination had no proper
probative value as to defendant's guilt -and since any value -it might
have in discrediting testimony as to defendant's reputation was outweighed by the danger of the jury's equating such claim with guilt,
allowance of such cross-examination was prejudicial error. Travis v.
United States, 247 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1957).
Basic to the entire question of admissibility of evidence is an understanding that circumstantial facts which are logically relevant should
nevertheless be excluded if there is a danger of their causing confusion
of issues, or unfair surprise, or undue prejudice.' Thus under the
823 (1956). Mr. Sanford, after a thorough analysis of the state of the
present law, suggests the following criteria for determining interspousal
liability: 1. "In any case where the action is based on an act or omission not
directly attributable to the existence of the family relation, but rather attributable to some other or additional relation, the action should be allowed.
[This would include such situations as carrier-passenger and master-servant.]
2. In any case where the action is based upon some willful, malicious, or
wanton act or omission, the action should be allowed. [This would include
beatings, undue punishment of children, etc.] 3. In any case where the
action is based upon some mere negligent act or omission which is directly
attributable to the existence of the family relation, it should not be allowed."
Id. at 845-46.
16. Insurance companies advance the theory that to allow inter-spousal
recovery would encourage collusive suits and would result in mass raids on
the insurance companies. Carver v. Ferguson, 254 P.2d 44 (Cal. App. 1953);
REV.

Newton v. Weber, 119 MVisc. 240, 196 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
1. I WIGMOaE,

EVIDENCE

§§ 29a, 42 (3d ed. 1940). See also 3 id. §§ 978-79.
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settled common law rule, evidence as to a defendant's evil character
or prior misconduct is completely inadmissible by the prosecution to
establish a probability of guilt.2 However, as character is relevant in
solving probabilities of guilt or innocence, the defendant may open
the doors to this line of inquiry,3 but the character witness must limit
his testimony to the general reputation of the accused in the community4 and may not testify as to his own opinion of defendant's
reputation.5 Once the defendant has attempted to show his good
character in his own behalf, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of defendant's bad character.5 The prosecution may crossexamine defendant's own witness as to the contents and extent of the
hearsay on which he bases his conclusions 7 and may cross-examine
the witness as to reports or rumors of defendant's bad character, not,
however, for purposes bearing upon the accused's guilt or innocence,
but solely for the purpose of impeaching the character witness. 8 The
witness may be required to disclose rumors and reports that are current even if they do not affect the witness' own conclusion.9 Furthermore, a witness may be cross-examined as to his knowledge of rumors
of prior disgraceful conduct on the part of the defendant but may not
be questioned as to the fact of the misconduct. 10 Defendant's character
witness may be cross-examined as to rumors of prior arrests of defendant whether or not they culminated in conviction. This is allowed
so as to permit the jury to evaluate the extent of the witness' knowl2. Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559 (1918); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57
(3d ed. 1940).
3. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 56 (3d ed. 1940).

4. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1609 (3d ed. 1940). Thus questions couched in
terms of "Have you heard?" are generally allowed while questions phrased
"Do you know?" are not. See Stewart v. United States, 104 F.2d 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); Filippelli v. United States, 6 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1925).
5. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
6. 1 WiGMorE, EVIDENCE § 58 (3d ed. 1940).
7. People v. Laudiero, 192 N.Y. 304, 85 N.E. 132 (1908). See also People
v. Elliott, 163 N.Y. 11, 57 N.E. 103 (1900).
8. See note 5 supra.This fine distinction may easily escape the jury even upon
proper instruction by the trial court, and they may well interpret such
questions as being germane to the issue of the accused's guilt or innocence.
Obviously, if the prosecution is allowed to parade groundless accusations
couched in the form of questions the jury is very likely to become prejudiced
against the accused. Heavy responsibility is thus placed upon trial courts
to ascertain (out of the jury's presence) whether or not such questions are
based upon the happening of actual events and thus protect the practice
from misuse. For a discussion of the discretion of the trial judge in allowing
cross-examination see 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 983 (3d ed. 1940). It has been
suggested that one possible means of handling this type situation would be to
require the trial judge, before permitting the prosecution's cross-examination of character witness as to rumors of misconduct of accused, to request
of the prosecutor a professional statement of the reasonable grounds upon
which the questions are based and the assurance that such grounds are substantiated by credible witnesses and evidence. MCCORmICK, EVIDENCE § 158
(1954).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
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edge.' Only a conviction, however, may be inquired about to undermine the veracity of a witness. As both guilty and innocent alike are
subject to arrest, it casts no aspersion to be arrested. However, if
defendant was convicted and defendant's character witness still maintains that defendant has a good reputation, such testimony may be
used as the basis of an inference by the jury that the character witness
was testifying falsely as to his knowledge of defendant's reputation. 2
In the instant case the court limits the scope of permissible questions
coming under the general category of prior disgraceful conduct. The
decision in the instant case that to allow cross-examination of witnesses as to the accused's prior claim of the privilege against selfincrimination was prejudicial error is based upon two propositions:
(1) the conduct to which the question referred was not "prior misconduct" which could logically rebut the character witness' testimony
on direct examination; (2) even if such could logically be its effect
the danger of undue prejudice and the like far outweigh the probative
value of the question. 13 "One who claims the rights and privileges of
the Constitution most certainly does not exhibit a character defect
of any kind and, if one who lawfully asserts the shelter of the Fifth
Amendment becomes, in so doing, a person of guilt or a perjurer in
the minds of some, the shame lies with those who misunderstand and
not with him who is entitled to protection .... ,,14
The court in the instant case was cognizant of the contemporary
communist scare and its possible resulting effect on the minds of
average jurors. This decision seems not only to be consistent with
established precedent but also desirable from a purely practical standpoint, and in our present day system of judicial process these two
concepts do not always go hand in hand. As pointed out by Mr.
Justice Rutledge, there is "Hardly an incident, however remote or derogatory, but can be drawn out by asking the witness who testifies to
the defendant's good character, 'Have you heard this' or 'Have you
heard that.' And many incidents, wholly innocent in quality, can be
turned by the prosecutor, through an inflection or tone, to cast aspersion upon the defendant by the mere asking of the question ....
,5
With regard to such questions, particularly ones so interwoven in the
minds of the jury with prejudice, fear and emotional aversion, this
case seems to reach a most fair, just and desirable result.
11. Mannix v. United States, 140 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1944); Josey v. United
States, 135 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Spalitto v. United States, 39 F.2d 782
(8th Cir. 1930).
12. See note 5 supra.
13. This holding seems consistent with the general discussion of crossexamination of character witnesses in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469 (1948), and is in line with Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
14. Instant case, 247 F.2d at 133.
15. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (dissent at 492).
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FAIR TRADE LAWS-ROBNSON-PATMAN ACTADVERTISING'IN A MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY A WHOLLY
OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF ONE BUYER WITHOUT
AFFORDING A SIMILAR BENEFIT TO COMPETING BUYERS
Plaintiffs, independent wholesale and retail food merchants located
in the Chicago trade area, brought an action against The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Woman's Day, Inc. (publisher of a
magazine sold exclusively in A & P stores and a wholly owned subsidiary of A & P), and certain food product manufacturers whose
products were sold on a nationwide scale, and whose products were
bought for resale by both the plaintiffs and A & P. Plaintiffs alleged
that the placing of advertisements in Woman's Day magazine by the
food product manufacturers was a violation of sections 2 (d) and (e)
of the Robinson-Patman Act.' Held, cause dismissed. A wholesaler or
producer's purchasing of advertising space in a publication owned
by one customer when like purchases from competing customers were
not and could not have been made, is not discriminatory favoritism
condemned by the Robinson-Patman Act, as long as the advertising is
primarily beneficial to the wholesaler or producer. State Wholesale
Grocers v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471
(N.D. Ill. 1957).
The Congressional purpose in enacting sections 2(d) and (e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act was to put an end to the prevalent practice
of manufacturers' and suppliers' giving discounts to large purchasers
under the guise of advertising and promotional allowances for services rendered, when, in fact, the services were not rendered.2 This
1. Act of June 19, 1936, c. 592, § 1, 49 STAT. 1526, amending 38 STAT. 730;

15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d) and (e) (1952). Section 13(d) provides: "It shall be un-

lawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person
in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products
or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless
such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to
all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
Section 13 (e) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate
in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to
furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or
facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale
of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers
on proportionally equal terms." In addition, in an effort to hold A & P
liable under § 13 (f), plaintiffs asserted that the conduct of defendant manufacturers violated § 13 (a) as well. However, since discrimination could not
be found under §§ 13(d) and (e) the issues under §§ 13(a) and (f) were
not reached.
2. See FTC, Report of Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.
1st Sess. (1934); Patman Committee Report H. R. Doc. No. 2679, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936). When services are not in fact performed, allowances become
merely price discriminations in disguise. See S. REP. No. 1502 and H.R. REP.
No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
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practice enabled large scale resale buyers to exact conditions of sale
which smaller competitive buyers could not command from the same
sellers. By exacting these favorable conditions of sale the favored
customer either sustained a price reduction not justified by cost savings or was able to shift part of his promotional and advertising costs
to the seller when competitors did not have similar opportunities. 3
Although the Federal Trade Commission has been active in seeing
that sections 2(d) and (e) are enforced, few cases have reached the
courts, so that many questions of construction under the act are still
unanswered. However, some points are reasonably clear. In order
to show actionable conduct under any section of the act there must
be a showing of at least two purchases, one by each of two separate
competitors, at or about the same time,4 for without this requirement
there can be no discrimination. 5 The fact that the plaintiff has in
the past been a purchaser, or is seeking to be such in the future, is
insufficient.6 Thus, no action is maintainable on the ground that the
defendant refuses to sell to the plaintiff while selling to plaintiff's
competitors.7 Also, the discrimination must be in respect to a specific
commodity, 8 the statute being aimed at discrimination by supplying
to a purchaser facilities not accorded to others when the commodity
is to be resold, whether in its original form or in a processed product 9
Thus, recovery has been allowed where the seller furnished to a retailer a demonstrator of the seller's product 10 and where the seller
advertised the products of a retailer," without according the same
service to other customers on "proportionally equal terms."'1 2 The
3. See Congressman Utterback's explanation of Sections 2(d) and (e), 80

CONG. REC. 9418 (1936).
4. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956).
5. Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 333 (3d. Cir. 1939).

6. Chicago Seating Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949);
Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 690, 695 (W.D. Okla.
1953).
7. See cases cited note 6 supra.
8. Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956). In
this case the defendant, U.S. Steel, allowed its wholly owned subsidiary,
the Union Supply Company, to take assignments of wages from defendant's
employees in making retail sales, which assignments would be recognized
and honored by the defendant. The same service was not extended to the
plaintiff, a competitor of Union Supply and customer of defendant. The
court in this case said that the service alleged to be discriminatory must relate to a specific commodity or to its sale, and that the services covered by
the Act are merchandising services and facilities. The products of defendant
which were handled by plaintiff here, however, were practically nil, being
only a few nails, and the de minimis rule was held applicable.
9. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 744 (1945).
10. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1945).
11. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945). Other types
of services which come within the purview of the Act may be found in

Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the RobinsonPatmanAct, 112 (rev. ed. 1953).
12. This is a term which has been criticized and seems to be ambiguous.
See Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act Be Amended? ROBINSON-
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statute prohibits not only an absolute refusal to furnish to one cus-

tomer a service which is furnished to another 13 but also the rendering
of services only to those customers who are able to meet standards
established by the seller.14
In the instant case the court was presented with the question of
whether payment made for services actually rendered by a wholly
owned subsidiary of a competitor of the plaintiffs was violative of

sections 2 (d) and (e) of the act. The court found that the purchase
of the advertising space was primarily designed to benefit the defendant suppliers with only incidental benefits accruing to A & P
through its ownership of the subsidiary. 5 The fact that Woman's Day
is a leading publication in its field, comparable to other leading
magazines, and the fact that the defendant suppliers gave the same
consideration to placing advertisements in this publication that they
did in regard to other publications, including other store distributed
magazines, was stressed at great length by the court in reaching its
decision. In addition, the court pointed out that although Woman's
Day is available only in A & P stores, the fact that A & P sold the
products advertised was not mentioned in the advertisements, that
customers seldom read the magazine in A & P stores, their being sold
Symposrum 146 (CCH 1948); Note, Anti-trust Laws-RobinsonPatman Act-Price Discrimination-ProportionallyEqual Terms, 32 N.C.L.
REv. 520 (1954).
13. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th
Cir. 1945); Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
14. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 806 (1947). These standards were described by the court as follows. "The terms which precluded 90% of petitioners' customers from being
accorded any demonstration service were the ability to 'cooperate' satisfactorily with petitioners by reciprocally furnishing to them the use of some
indeterminate aggregate of services and facilities to promote the resale of
Arden cosmetics, such as carrying a representative stock, making available adequate counter displays, advertising once or twice a month, furnishing a
reasonable number of window displays, and mentioning Arden cosmetics in
fashion shows." 156 F.2d at 133. In the event that a party believes that he
is violating the act, he may sue for cancellation of the contract which binds
him to the violation, and thus relieve himself from further liability. United
Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
15. It was found that in 1954, 73.3% of the advertising revenue of Woman's
Day came from suppliers whose products were sold in A & P stores, while
26.7% came from advertisers whose products were not sold in A & P stores.
In 1955 the ratio was 65.5% to 34.5%. Therefore, reasoned the plaintiffs, as
less than one quarter of the cost of producing Woman's Day was recovered
through the sale of copies, the advertisers whose products were sold by A & P
made publication of the magazine possible. The court, however, said this
argument was a case of "the proverbial tail wagging the proverbial dog,"
and that the admitted high quality of the magazine made the advertisements
possible. Woman's Day was among the ten top magazines in circulation and
among the top twenty-five in advertising revenue. Continuing, the court
said that it was clear that advertisers would not advertise in a magazine
which the public would not buy, and that the public did not buy a magazine
for its advertisements, but for its editorial content. It followed that the defendants did not furnish the magazine to A & P. Instant case, 154 F. Supp.
488-89.
PATmAN ACT
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only at the check-out counters, that grocery shoppers are generally
not loyal to one store, and therefore the plaintiffs derived some benefit from the advertisements just as A & P did. The extensive consideration of these factors in finding nonliability may be an indication
that where there is a clear violation of section 2 (d) and (e), the use
of the subsidiary corporation might not be effective to insulate the
parent. The court also indicated that the absence of intent to discriminate might be relevant in that it tends to establish the action of the
defendant as what it purports to be, and not the giving of a price dis-

count in disguise.
When a statute purports to prohibit or proscribe conduct, questions
naturally arise as to what acts are included and what are excluded:
thus, any addition in the way of an adjudicated court case looms large,
with each case serving to further clarify the limits of permissible
conduct. The instant case shows that advertisements in a customerowned magazine are not necessarily unlawful under the RobinsonPatman Act, even though similar consideration is not accorded to all
buyers on proportionally equal terms, when the advertisements paid
for are actually given and the recipients of the payments receive only
incidental benefits. Congress should not be understood as having
meant to have favored the weak and independent business man over
the large and powerful chain organization, but to treat the two on a
par. In view of this the court seems to have reached the right result.

LABOR LAW-FREE SPEECH-POWER OF STATE COURT
TO ENJOIN ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
BY NON-EMPLOYEES
Petitioner union sought unsuccessfully to solicit union membership
among the employees of respondent, a Wisconsin producer of sand
and gravel. Thereupon, the union peacefully picketed' the entrance
to respondent's plant, none of the pickets being employees of respondent. Respondent brought suit in the state court to enjoin the
picketing on the ground that it violated a Wisconsin statute which prohibited picketing in the absence of a labor dispute,2 and obtained a
permanent injunction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on rehearing,
affirmed, holding the picketing illegal upon the finding that it was for
1. Neither mass picketing nor any trace of violence or physical coercion
of the respondent's employees was involved. The picketing was entirely
peaceful. The pickets carried signs reading, "The men on this job are not
100% affiliated with the AFL." It was stipulated that no labor dispute existed
between the respondent and its employees.
2. Wis. STAT. § 103.535 (1955) declares unlawful picketing in the absence
of a "labor dispute" between the employer and a majority of his employees.
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an unlawful purpose under a different statute 3 than that relied upon by
the trial court.4 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. A state court's injunction of peaceful picketing which has
for its purpose forcing employer coercion of union membership among
his employees in violation of state statutory policy does not infringe
upon the right of free speech.5 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
In 1937 the right to picket and its correlation to free speech had
an almost casual beginning in the now famous dictum of Justice
Brandeis.6 Some three years later, this dictum became established law
when, in Thornhill v. Alabama7 the Supreme Court held that peaceful picketing was broadly synonymous with freedom of communication and, as such, entitled to constitutional protection against state
infringement. 8 Utilizing this broad principle in the later case of
AFL v. Swing,9 the Court granted labor unions the right of organizational picketing by strangers, i.e., non-employees, in holding that a
state court injunction against such picketing was a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech.10 The cases decided prior to
1949, including Thornhill and Swing, were of a fairly consistent pat3. Wis. STAT. § 111.06 (2) (b) (1955) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employee individually or in concert with others to "coerce, intimidate or
induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees in the enjoyment
of their legal rights, including ...

[the right to join or assist labor organiza-

tions], or to engage in any practice with regard to his employees which would
constitute an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative."
4. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had at first reversed the trial court, holding Wis. STAT. § 103.535 (1955), see note 2 supra, unconstitutional on the
ground that picketing could not be enjoined merely because of the absence
of a labor dispute, and relying on AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941). Upon
reargument, however, the court withdrew its original opinion and held that
the picketing was contrary to state policy as declared by Wis. STAT. § 111.06
(2) (b) (1955), see note 3 supra and therefore properly enjoinable. The
court's original decision is commented upon in 31 NOTRE DAME LAw. 296
(1956).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. "Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by
a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S.
468, 478 (1937). For an excellent historical review of changing judicial views
of picketing, see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 334-69 (rev. ed. 1949). Concerning the general problem of picketing and constitutional protection, see
Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951).
7. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8. The Court reversed the criminal conviction of pickets who had been
found guilty of violating a local ordinance making all picketing unlawful,
holding that peaceful picketing was a form of free expression guaranteed by
the first amendment and that it could not be constitutionally transgressed
by state law. 310 U.S. at 95, 105. The unlawful per se nature of the Alabama statute becomes extremely important in interpreting later cases involving the Thornhill doctrine. See Burstein, Picketing and Speech, 4 LAB. L.J.
791 (1953); Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected? 99
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1950); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 180 (1942).

9. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
10. See Smoot, Stranger Picketing: Permanent Injunction or Permanent
Litigation? 42 A.B.AJ. 817 (1956).
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tern, the controlling factor being the "means" used by the pickets. As
long as the picketing was peaceful, a state court could not constitutionally enjoin it;" but if the contrary was true, constitutional protection
was not afforded it and the picketing could be enjoined.' 2 Then in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 13 decided in April of 1949, the
"purpose" or "objective" of the picketing also became of critical importance in regard to constitutional protection. There the Supreme
Court held that picketing, peaceful in itself, could be enjoined by a
state court where the purpose of the picketing was to require the
employer to violate a state "anti-trade-restraint" statute. 14 Cases
which followed enlarged upon the Giboney principle of unlawful purpose in holdings that peaceful picketing which had for its objective
forcing employer coercion of his employees' choice of bargaining
agent,15 violation of a state "right-to-work" statute,16 and violation of
a state's public policy against discrimination 7 was properly enjoinable
11. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery
& Pastry Drivers Local 802, Teamsters Union, AFL v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949).
12. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (mass picketing); Hotel & Restaurant
Employees' Alliance v. Wisconsin Employmeiit Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437
(1942) (peaceful picketing coupled with Violence); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (peaceful picketing set
in a context of violence).
13. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
14. The union had picketed to force the company to cease selling ice to
nonunion peddlers in order to induce the peddlers to join the union. The
picketing was enjoined by a Missouri court on the ground that its purpose
was to violate the state's "anti-trade-restraint" statute. The Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the injunction saying, "Neither Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, nor Carlson v. California... supports the contention that conduct otherwise unlawful is always immune from state regulation because
an integral part of that conduct is carried on by display of placards by
peaceful picketers." 336 U.S. at 498; cf. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). See Howard, The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine
in Peaceful Picketing and its Application in the California Cases, 24 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 145 (1951).

15. Building Serv. Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
16. Local 10, United Ass'n of Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
Nineteen states currently have "right-to-work" enactments which outlaw
agreements requiring membership or retention of membership in a union
as a condition of continued employment. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§ 375 (Supp. 1955); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 -212 (1956). Such statutes
would seem to furnish a prime unlawful purpose upon which a state injunction of picketing could be based. But see Local 429, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969, reversing
per curiam 299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957); Mamet, Federal Pre-emption, Free
Speech and Right to Work Statutes, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1957).
17. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). In the Hanke decision, the Court made clear that it was immaterial whether the illegality
of purpose is established by the state legislature or judiciary in determining
whether state injunctive restraint of picketing violates the guarantee of
freedom of speech. 339 U.S. at 479. The Court further explained its general position on picketing in saying, "The effort n the [picketing] cases
has been to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the
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by a state court. More recently, this area of the law has been further
complicated by the so-called "federal pre-emption" doctrine which
has a basis independent of picketing-free speech considerations, but
which seems to have become the predominant factor in picketing
cases. 18 But apart from the problems raised by federal pre-emption, the
Supreme Court's decisions obviously allow the state courts wide discretion in the area of picketing injunctions in regard to free speech
objections, and this discretion has been frequently exercised. 19
As to the scope of protection afforded picketing by the first amendment, the Court in the instant case makes clear what most authorities have long suspected. 20 The Court frankly acknowledges a "reassessment" of the broad assimilation of free speech and picketing
contained in Thornhill, and makes decisive the Giboney principle of
unlawful purpose.2 1 The Thornhill case is to be restricted to its specific holding, i.e., a state may not constitutionally place blanket prohibitions on all picketing.2 2 But, however, if a state has designed
a remedy to meet a specific situation or to accomplish a particular
social policy, the state, consistent with the guarantee of free speech,
can enjoin peaceful picketing which has a contrary objective. 23 Conelement of communication in picketing and the 'power of the State to
set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.'" 339
U.S. at 474.

18. Simply stated, the "federal pre-emption" doctrine as applied to labor
the Taft-Hartley Act, state law may not be constitutionally applied. See
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 78 Sup. Ct. 206 (1957); Teamsters Union, AFL

relations is to the effect that when state law conflicts with federal law, viz.,
v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957), reversing per curiam 296
S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. App. 1956); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats,

Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S.

26 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v.
Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). For authoritative treatments of the
doctrine and its application by the Supreme Court, see Cox, Federalism in the

Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Glushien, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 15 FED. B. J. 4 (1955); Isaacson, Federal Versus

State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956); Scurlock, Preemption in Labor Relations, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 555 (1957).
19. See, e.g., Bitzer Motor Co. v. Local 604, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL, 349 Ill. App. 283, 110 N.E.2d 674 (1953); Blue Boar Cafeteria
Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 254 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. 1952), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 834 (1953); Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters Local 164, AFL, 335

Mich. 478, 56 N.W.2d 357 cert. denied, 345 U.S. 957 (1953); Chucales v. Royalty,
164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955); Baderak v. Building & Constr. Trades
Council AFL, 380 Pa. 477, 112 A.2d 170 (1955); Hagen v. Culinary Workers
Alliance, 70 Wyo. 165, 246 P.2d 778 (1952). See also Note, 5 UTAH L. REV. 98
(1956).

20. See Jones, The Right to Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102

U. PA. L. REV. 995 (1954); Price, Picketing-A Legal Cinderella, 7 U. Fla. L.

REV. 143 (1955); Rose, Limitations on the Power of States to Enjoin Picketing, 41 VA. L. REv. 581 (1955); Note, 39 GEO. L.J. 114 (1950).
21. "The implied reassessments of the broad language of the Thornhill case
were finally generalized in a series of cases sustaining injunctions against
peaceful picketing. . . . The decisive reconsideration came in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co." Instant case, 354 U.S. at 291.
22. Id. at 289, 295.
23. " his series of cases, then, established a broad field in which a State, in
enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and
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sequently, after sustaining as valid the Wisconsin court's finding that
the picketers' purpose was one violative of state statutory policy,
the Court upholds the prohibition of picketing by petitioner union. 24
Although there is a pronounced similarity between the Wisconsin
statute and provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 5 there seems to
have been no question of federal pre-emption presented.2
The instant case is the first in which the Supreme Court specifically
upholds a state injunction against stranger picketing for organizational purposes.2 7 This holding together with earlier decisions establishes the principle that such organizational picketing can be
state enjoined, not only if the "means," i.e., violence, are illegal, but
also if any objective of the picketing is held by a state court to be
against state policy. This does not mean that picketing is to be given
no constitutional protection by the first amendment against state acion. Picketing is free speech; but like any other form of free speech
it is to be considered an absolute right. Conduct to achieve an
illegal end has never been clothed with constitutional immunity by
the first amendment.28 So viewed, the unlawful purpose test of
Giboney is perfectly compatible and consistent with orthodox concepts of free speech. 29 The most valid objection to the testis&-that it
seems to be mechanically applied by the Supreme Court. Though
the characterization of the picketers' purpose is said to be subject
to judicial inquiry by the Supreme Court,30 the state court's finding
on this matter is generally treated as conclusive. 31 The instant case is
an apt illustration. The Wisconsin court drew the "inference" that the
picketing was for the purpose of forcing the employer to coerce union
whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." Instant case, 354 U.S. at 293.
24. Id. at 295.
25. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
26. "The record before the trial court showed that the interstate business
of the Company [respondent] was de minimis. No question of federal preemption was directly or indirectly involved in the case." Letter from the
firm of Padway, Goldberg & Previant, counsel for petitioner union, to the
Vanderbilt Law Review, Dec. 9, 1957. But cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See Mamet, supra note 16, at 171-72.
27. Cf. Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, appeal dismissed, 350
U.S. 870 (1955).
28. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (forceful overthrow of the Government);
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (polygamy); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (obstruction of armed forces recruiting). Nor does the free
speech provision contained in § 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act immunize such
conduct. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
29. See Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst Confusion, A
Consistent Principle, 29 So. CALiF. L. Rav. 137 (1956).
30. "Of course, the mere fact that there is 'picketing' does not automatically
justify its restraint without an investigation into its conduct and purposes."
Instant case, 354 U.S. at 294.
31. A position of the Supreme Court which was strongly and thoroughly
attacked in the instant case, but to no avail. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 9-16.
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membership among his employees. Such an inference can always be
drawn since any organizational picketing, by its very nature and
though not its primary purpose, exerts some economic pressure on
the employer which can be relieved by his employees' acceptance of
union membership. Thus, as to constitutional objections, it seems that
a state may suppress any particular type of picketing for any reason
other than a blanket prohibition of picketing per se. The result in
the instant case is that labor's right "to organize" by peaceful stranger
picketing is one which has essentially been rendered innocuous.

LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTAPPLICATION OF SECTION (8) (b) (4) (A) TO "SECONDARYBOYCOTT" TYPE PRESSURE UNDER "HOT CARGO" CLAUSE
Complainant, an employer involved in a dispute with Machinist
union, alleged that Teamster' union officials violated section 8 (b) (4)
(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 2 by instructing
their members, employees of truck firms, not to handle products of
complainant's plant. Despite a "hot cargo" contract clause under which
the truck firm's employees could not be required to handle struck
goods, the carriers had requested the workers to do so. Union leaders
had continued to urge these workers at the carriers' unloading platforms to refuse to handle the goods. The National Labor Relations
Board by a three-to-two decision held that the union leaders' enforcement of such a clause by appeals to employees was a violation of
section 8(b) (4) (A). Two of the majority members felt that the hot
cargo clause itself was valid but that appeals to employees to enforce
it violated the Act. Upon appeal, held, reversed. When a secondary
employer has previously agreed not to handle goods of a struck
1. The same charges were brought against the Machinists. The Board held
that the Machinists had violated section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act (see note 2
infra) and the circuit court affirmed, ruling they were neither parties nor
third party beneficiaries of the Teamster-carrier contract, and so could not
use the "hot cargo" provision as a defense to the charge of urging a secondary
boycott.
2. The pertinent words of the section read:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person .... " 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A)
(1952).
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employer, but violates the contract by urging its employees to do so,
union officials are not in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) in urging
their members not to handle the goods. General Drivers Union v.
NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"Hot cargo" clauses ordinarily provide that the employees covered
may refuse to handle or work on goods designated by the union as
"unfair."3 Enforcing such a clause can result in secondary boycott-type
pressure, by enabling workers under it to put comparable pressure
on their employer to refrain from dealing with another employer who
is in a labor dispute. While Congress evidently intended to outlaw
many if not all of the types of pressure normally associated with the
term "secondary boycott,"4 it used the narrower, technical language
of section 8(b) (4) (A), presenting the Board and the courts with the
problem of determining if each situation falls within the statutory
prohibition, rather than whether the activity is that traditionally
known as a "secondary boycott." The initial NLRB position was based
on the strict interpretation that, since the employer had agreed not
to handle struck goods, the enforcement of the hot cargo clause by
workers could not constitute a "strike or concerted refusal" "forcing
or requiring" employers to boycott the struck goods, and the action
was not violative of section 8 (b) (4) (A).5 The Board later decided
that direct appeals to workers by union leaders to enforce these
clauses did fall within the statutory prohibition, 6 and has recently
held in a common carrier case that the clause itself is invalid as
repugnant to the policy of the Act. 7 The Ninth Circuit has recently
3. A typical clause reads: "It shall not be a violation of this Contract and

it shall not be cause for discharge if any employee or employees refuse to
go through the picket lines of a Union or refuse to handle unfair goods.
Nor shall the exercise of any rights permitted by law be a violation of this
Contract.
"The term 'unfair goods' as used in this Article includes, but is not limited
to, any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled, or used by any
carrier, whether party to this Agreement or not, at whose terminal or terminals
or place or places of business there is a controversy between such carrier or
"
its employees on the one hand, and a Labor Union on the other hand ....
Madden v. Local 442, Teamsters Union, AFL, 114 F. Supp. 932, 935, 936 (W.D.
Wis. 1953).
4. 93 CONG. REC. 4342 (1947).
5. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). An anomalous situation results from the fact that only "concerted" pressure is outlawed by section
8 (b) (4) (A). While section 8 (b) (4) specifically authorizes individual refusal

to cross a picket line, by implication any refusal to handle struck goods-no

matter how far removed in time and distance from the primary dispute-is
legal as long as it is motivated by personal ideals and convictions of the
individual workers. Thus, very strong secondary pressures could be legally
imposed by exercise of individual rights by workers, where the same actions
would be illegal if the workers were "advised" of these rights by union
leaders. Meir & Pohimann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.
1956).
6. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
7. Genuine Parts Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 53 (1957). Chairman Boyd Leedom and
Member Joseph A. Jenkins confined their holding of invalidity of 'hot cargo"
clauses to common carrier contracts. Member Philip R. Rodgers concurred
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adopted the current position and policy reasons of the Board.8 Two
of the reviewing courts which have ruled on the issue-the Second
and District of Columbia Circuits-have held to the contrary, declaring
the clauses themselves valid and that union leaders may legally enforce them by appeals to employers or workers. 9 Their argument is
that the language of the statute is clear, and since the employer has
consented in advance to the stoppage, enforcement by the workers
cannot be "forcing or requiring" the employer by a "concerted refusal
in the course of their employment" or "strike."'1
In the principal case the court adopts this earlier rationale of the
NLRB,by first holding the hot cargo clauses themselves not violative
of the Act," and then reasoning that union pressure under the clauses
cannot constitute "forcing or requiring" the employer who had agreed
to this position in advance.'2 Since the fact situation here of direct
appeals to workers by union leaders is closer to the statutory wording
than most 13 of the other circumstances under which these cases arise,
it is probable that the less analagous cases would be decided the same
way. The court's position is based on the conviction that congressional
intent in outlawing secondary boycotts was the desire to protect secondary employers and that prior agreement to a "hot cargo" contract
would operate to waive such protection. The opposite view is that
employers cannot waive the section 8 (b) (4) (A) protection because
Congress intended for it to protect the primary employer and the
public, 4 and that rights conferred as a matter of public policy cannot
be waived. 15 Having held the "hot cargo" clause valid, the court
here reasons that the employer should not be allowed to escape his
obligation, and, since other remedies appear inadequate, the union
should be allowed to assert its rights through appeals to the workers. 16
with the opinion such a clause is invalid in all industries. Member Stephen
S. Bean concurred in finding the clause valid, but enforcement of it illegal.
Member Abe Murdock dissented in finding the clause valid and its enforcement legal.
8. NLRB v. Local 1976, Brotherhood of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1957).
9. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Milk Drivers Union v.
NLRB, 32 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 70777 (2d Cir. 1957).
10. There is an excellent summary of the Second Circuit Court's rationale
at 32 id. at 94259-62.
11. 247 F.2d at 74.
12. Ibid.

13. The action of the Machinist union leaders in the instant case seems most

nearly to fit the express statutory prohibition, notwithstanding the dissent of
Judge Washington. 247 F.2d at 77.
14. At times discussion in Congress over section 8(b) (4) (A) emphasized
protection of innocent secondary employers. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 4323 (1947). Other statements emphasized
protection of primary employers and the public. 93 CONG. REc. 4323 (1947);
93 id. at 4198, 5074, 5075; S.REP.No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947). Representative Hartley said the section was to protect primary and secondary
employers. H.R. REP.No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947).
15. McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 1779 (1954).
16. 247 F.2d at 74.
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The clear break indicated in this case between some reviewing courts
and the NLRB seems to arise from a basic difference in the respective
approaches to the "hot cargo" problem. While the Board and the
Ninth Circuit Court has come to the position of measuring the union's
activity against the supposed policy and intent of section 8 (b) (4) (A),
other courts compare the union's contract-enforcing efforts against
the specific language of the section. Since there are four cases on
this question on the Supreme Court's docket for the October Term, 7
the conflict should be resolved in the near future.

LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACTREFUSAL TO BARGAIN WITH OLD-PLANT EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATIVE AFTER RELOCATION OF PLANT
Respondent, a small manufacturer of shoes, subject to the Labor
Management Relations Act, moved its operations from a location in
downtown Los Angeles to other premises twelve miles across the city.'
Only a few employees made the move to the new location. At the
time of this action the original collective bargaining agent had not
been certified as representative of employees at the new location.
In proceedings before the NLRB, 2 respondent was found guilty of unfair labor practices in setting up another corporation as a front in
order to disregard its contract with the union and in refusing, both
before and after the move, to bargain about the transfer of employees
from the old plant to the new plant. 3 On petition for enforcement,
17. NLRB v. General Drivers, appeal docketed No. 273, D.C. Cir., July 12,

1957; Machinists v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No. 324, D.C. Cir., July 30, 1957;
Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No. 127, 9th Cir., May 13,
1957; NLRB v. Milk Drivers Union, appeal docketed, No. 412, 2d Cir., Aug. 27,
1957.
1. Respondent had a union shop contract with Local 122, United Shoe
Workers, employing from 20 to 30 workers. Only a few of these appeared
on the payroll of the new corporation, and the union did not succeed in
preserving the majority status at the new plant. Respondent, California Co.,
represented to the union that it was ceasing production entirely, and had
no control over the new plant. Actually, respondent had contracted with
one of its own foremen, who owned a small corporation called Trina. Trina
was the ostensible employer at the new plant. The Board found that the
foreman had lent his corporate structure to California for the sake of appearance, but that he himself still occupied the position of foreman for
California. The Board found, in fact, that the new plant was the alter ego
or agent of California.
2. Jack Lewis, 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955). See 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 93
(1956).
3. A violation of section 8 (a) (5) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1952). The
majority of the Board held that, after the plant was moved, respondent
further violated this section of the act by: (1) refusing to apply its existing
contract to the new plant; (2) unilaterally establishing wages and working
conditions at the new plant which differ substantially from those in the Los
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held, affirmed. 4 Projected removal of a plant to a new location is a
matter about which an employer must bargain upon request, and
when the failure of employees to transfer is due to the employer's
unfair labor practices, the duty to bargain with the original union
continues even though that union has not established its majority
status at the new location. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.
1957).
It is well established that an unfair labor practice may be predicated
upon an employer's removing his plant to a new location, when he has
acted with intent to evade his obligations under the Labor Management Relations Act.5 A removal, discontinuance or suspension of
operations is not an unfair labor practice in and of itself, but may
become one because of the purpose to be accomplished by such
action. 6 The Board has found no violation of the Act where it has
decided that the removal of operations was motivated entirely by
economic considerations and not by a purpose to avoid bargaining with
or to discourage membership in the union.7 There is an unlawful refusal to bargain when the employer fails to advise the union of the
projected plant removal and to bargain as to the effect of the removal
on the tenure of the employees involved.8 There can also be an unlawful refusal to bargain by the employer after the move to the new
site. But before such a refusal can be found, the Board must first
determine that the old union is now the statutory representative of
the employees at the new plant. To do this the Board must decide
whether the old-plant employees would or would not have transferred
Angeles contract; and (3) by refusing to recognize the union as the representative of employees at the new location.
4. Except as to alleged discrimination against one employee, and an order
of reinstatement concerning him.
5. NLRB v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1952); Diaper
Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954); In the Matter of Howard Rome, 77 N.L.R.B. 1217
(1948); In the Matter of Isaac Schieber, 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
6. The test appears to be whether the employer's intent, reason, and motive
is to discharge or get rid of its employees for union activity, or to break a
union or impede the new organization of the union. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co.,
supra note 5. See Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th
Cir. 1954). Where there is a dispute as to the employer's motive, the task to
determine it is often a difficult one. "It involves an inquiry into the state of
mind of the employer. Such inquiry is laden with uncertainties and false
paths. .. ." Martel Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 624, 631 (4th Cir. 1940).
7. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6 (inefficient production);
Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954) (insolvency of the business;
cheaper rent and/or lower taxes at the new site, and more accessible markets
at the new location); Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999
(1953) (high cost of materials and distance from their source); In the Matter
of Fiss Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 125 (1942).
8. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., supra note 7; Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954); In the Matter of Howard Rome, 77 N.L.R.B. 1217
(1948). It is similarly a violation of section 8 (a) (3) of the Act when the
move is motivated by an anti-union purpose. Such a move constitutes an
unlawful lockout and discharge of employees. NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184
F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); Diaper Jean Mg. Co., supra.
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to the new plant had the employer bargained about such a transfer.9
If the employees would have moved, it is assumed that they would
have, in theory, carried the union with them, preserving its status;
if they would not have moved, the union could have no status. In
Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co.,'0 which involved a thirty mile
move across a stretch of open highway, the Board held that it could
make no assumption that a majority of employees would have moved
to the new plant."
The Board, in the instant proceedings, found that while the plant
was relocated primarily for economic and health reasons, the respondent also utilized the move to rid itself of the union and dissipate its majority status. This secondary purpose thus converted
respondent's otherwise lawful action-i.e., the plant relocation-into
an unfair labor practice. 12 The Board further held that, in addition to
the duty to bargain before moving, the employer's duty to bargain continued after the move although the union had not in fact established
its majority status at the new plant.13 In arriving at this latter conclusion, the Board stated that it was for the employer to show that
a number of employees sufficient to preserve the union's status would
not have transferred, even if respondent had bargained in good faith
concerning employee transfers. 14 In the absence of affirmative evidence to this effect, the Board considered it reasonable to believe that
the employees would have transferred, thus preserving the status of
the union as bargaining agent. Therefore, the continued refusal to
bargain with the union after relocation resulted in a separate and distinct unfair labor practice. Although the court wondered why the
Board should assume that employees would not make such a move
9. Brown Truck and Trailer MWfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).

10. Ibid. The plant was removed 30 miles to another town, the Board
finding that the move was motivated by economic reasons, with no anti-union
motive.
11. This was held to be so even if agreement had been reached prior to the
move concerning employee transfer.
12. Jack Lewis, 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 767 (1955)..The Board held that in view

of the employer's use of the move to get rid of the union, the fact that there
was an economic removal of the plant ceased to be controlling.
13. Id. at 765. The majority of the Board held that the union's contract
remained in effect after the plant removal and therefore could not lawfully be terminated except in accordance with the requirements of section
8 (d)of the act. The employer thus violated both section 8 (d) and section
8 (a) (5) when it unilaterally changed wages and working conditions at the
new site.
14. Id. at 768. The Board pointed out that the '"well-established principle" is that the burden is upon respondents to disentangle the consequence
of their lawful conduct from that of their unlawful conduct, citing NLRB v.
Swinerton, 202 F.2d 511, 515-516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953);
NLRB v. Barrett Co., 135 F.2d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1943). See also TennesseeCarolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1371 n. 4 (1954), where the Board
stated that whether or not employees would have accepted an offer of employment was not susceptible of any objective test unless and until the offer
was made.
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as that involved in the Brown case, but, in the instant case, would
move twelve miles across metropolitan Los Angeles, 15 it affirmed the
Board's action, concluding that from the record it could not hold that
most of the employees would not have moved with the plant.16
Although the court observes that the Board finds a violation of the
Act depending upon whether or not it thinks the employees would have
moved, it does not discuss why the burden is put upon the employer
to show that the employees would not have transferred, while no such
burden was placed on the employer in the Brown case. The Board's
position turns, apparently, upon the question of the employer's motivation. In the instant case the Board found the employer's manifest
plan to eliminate the union to be controlling; in the Brown case
no such plan or intent was found. The Board seems to return to the
basic test in these cases: Is it the intent of the employer to discourage
or break the union? When such intent is found, there seems to be
a presumption that, had there been no refusal to bargain prior to the
move, the employees would have transferred and the union would
have retained its status. In that instance the burden is upon the
employer to rebut the presumption. When no such anti-union intent
is found, there is no such presumption, and the employer has no such
burden. Involving, as these cases do, an inquiry into the subjective
intent of the employer, when the case is a close one upon the evidence,
the personal beliefs of the members of the Board will be an even
greater factor than usual in determining whether or not an unfair
labor practice has been committed.
15. Instant Case, 246 F.2d at 888-89. In the Board's opinion, Acting Chairman Rodgers, dissenting in part, said that the majority was either overrulling
the Brown case, or was limiting the rule of that case to employers in North
Carolina and establishing a different rule for employers in Calfiornia. Jack
Lewis, 114 N.L.R.B. 765, 775 (1955). The court finds merit in Rodgers' latter
contention.
16. 246 F.2d at 889. The court states that it is not wise enough to resolve
the problem on judicial notice. Some courts are hesitant about overturning
the Board's interpretation and application of the facts, and rely instead on
the assumed expertness of the members, although the Board itself, and at
times the individual members, is not always consistent on any one problem.
Other courts have no such hesitancy in interpreting the facts differently
from the Board and in arriving at different conclusions of law based on the
same facts. See Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th
Cir. 1954).
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LABOR LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REFUSAL
TO SUBMIT TO OPERATION TO REDUCE DISABILITY
RESULTING FROM RUPTURED INTERVERTEBRAL DISC
The Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Law' provides that compensation will be suspended if the injured employee refuses to submit
to reasonable medical treatment. Plaintiff, the carrier of employer's
insurance, requested that defendant, an employee who had sustained
a ruptured intervertebrate disc due to an injury arising out of his
employment, be required to submit to an operation 2 to reduce his
disability.3 Defendant's refusal to submit to the operation was largely
based on fear,4 and he offered no medical testimony to show that his
fear was well grounded. Three medical witnesses for plaintiff testified
that the danger of detrimental results was remote. The trial court
ordered that defendant submit to the operation or further compensation payments would be disallowed. On appeal, held, reversed. It was
not unreasonable for the defendant to refuse a major operation in
order to reduce his disability where there was some slight degree of
risk of life present, notwithstanding uncontroverted expert testimony
by three specialists that any danger was rather remote and that
surgery was recommended. Edwards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 304 S.W.2d
489 (Tenn. 1957).
It is a rule of the common law of tort that an injured plaintiff owes
to the defendant a duty of exercising reasonable care to reduce or
minimize his injuries by reasonable medical treatment.5 This commonlaw doctrine has been adopted by many of the workmen's compensation statutes, 6 which impose a duty upon the employee to submit to
1. "If the injured employee refuses to comply with any reasonable request
for examination or to accept the medical or specialized medical services which
the employer is required to furnish under the provisions of this law, his right
to compensation shall be suspended and no compensation shall be due and
payable while he continues such refusal." TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (1956).
2. A laminectomy: "surgical removal of the posterior arch of a vertebra."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1953).
For a
thorough discussion of the medico-legal problems involved in operations and

injuries in this area see Bear, IntervertebralDisc Injuries In Workmen's Compensation, 6 VAND. L. REV. 883 (1953).

3. Specialists' testimony indicated the probability of a reduction in disability from permanent total to 15% or 20% permanent partial disability.
Instant case, 304 S.W.2d at 489.
4. There was also evidence that defendant had experienced unfavorable
results in two minor operations as a child. 304 S.W.2d at 489.
5. See, e.g., Updegraff v. City of Ottumwa, 210 Iowa 382, 226 N.W. 928
(1929), 14 MIN. L. REV. 294 (1930); Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md.
264, 138 Atl. 1 (1927); Mickelson v. Fischer, 81 Wash. 423, 142 Pac. 1160 (1914);
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 33, 36 (1935).
6. It is important to note that here, the employer's liability is created by
the workmen's compensation statute, not by the breach of any common-law
duty. Provisions worded similarly to the Tennessee statute are fairly common
m workmen's compensation enactments. Such a provision is included in the
statutes of the federal government [the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers'

Compensation Act, as amended 48

STAT.

806 (1934), 33 U.S.C. § 907 (1952)],

and in the statutes of 22 states. These states are: ALA.

CODE

AN. tit. 26,
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reasonable medical treatment or surgery and provide that an unreasonable refusal of the proposed operation results in a suspension 7
of the employee's compensation payments. 8 The problem in each
case is whether the refusal is reasonable. 9 Where the operation is only
of a minor character, most courts have held that there is no significant
risk involved and that a refusal of the tendered operation is unreasonable.'0 However, in major surgery there is always some element of
risk of life prevalent," and here courts have been reluctant to find
a refusal unreasonable. 12 Essentially, of course, reasonableness is a
question for the finder of fact; in each case such factors as the employee's age and physical condition,13 his past surgical experience, 14 the
§ 23-1027 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1311
(Supp. 1957); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4056 (Deering 1937); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-12-12 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7426 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 2353 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-501 (1935); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1225
(1952); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 31, § 22
(1954); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6998-08 (1942); MO. REV. STAT. § 287.140 (1949);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 15-23 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-20 (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1950); ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.280 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 531 (1952); S.C. CODE § 72-305 (1952); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307, § 4 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 102.42 (1955); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-124 (1945).
7. Comparing such a compensation case to tort law some courts, including
an early Tennessee decision, state that after the refusal of reasonable treatment
a claimant's injury can not be said to have been proximately caused by his
employment. Sun Coal Co. v. Wilson, 147 Tenn. 118, 245 S.W. 547 (1922);
Lesh v. Illinois Steel Co., 163 Wis. 124, 157 N.W. 539 (1916).
8. An early and oft-quoted Scotch case states the standard to be applied.
"[I]f the operation is not attended with danger to life or health, or extraordinary suffering, and if according to the best medical and surgical opinion
the operation offers a reasonable prospect of restoration, or relief from the
incapacity from which the workman is suffering, then he must either submit
to the operation or release his employers from the obligation to maintain him."
Donnelly v. Baird and Co., [1908] 15 Scots L.T.R. 799, 801.
9. Some courts have stated it a bit differently to the effect that it was not
whether it was unreasonable for the employee to refuse the treatment, but
whether the employee acted reasonably so as not to place himself in peril
by accepting the treatment. Strong v. Sonken-Galamba Iron & Metal Co.,
109 Kan. 117, 198 Pac. 182 (1921); Neault v. Parker-Young Co., 86 N.H. 231,

§ 293 (1940); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

166 Atl. 289 (1933); 10 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2019 (1953).

10. Joliet Motor Co. v. Industrial Bd., 280 Ill. 148, 117 N.E. 423 (1917)
(removal of cataract); Kricinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co., 192 Mich.
687, 159 N.W. 362 (1916) (minor bone operation).
11. 'Equally

true is the rule . . . that the Industrial Commission has no

authority to compel an employee to submit to a major operation where there
is a risk of life involved in the 'slightest degree!'" K. Lee Williams Theatres,
Inc. v. Mickle, 201 Okla. 279, 205 P.2d 513, 516 (1949). The case is quoted and
relied upon by the court in the instant case. Also see in connection with the
element of risk involved Bear, supra note 2, at 889.
12. Overton v. Denver, 106 Colo. 114, 102 P.2d 474 (1940) (goiter); Russell
v. Virginia Bridge & Iron Co., 172 Tenn. 268, 111 S.W.2d 1027 (1938), 15
TENN. L. REV. 403 (leg amputation); Fred Cantrell Co. v. Goosie, 148 Tenn.
282, 255 S.W. 360 (1923) (operation to correct bad union of fractured leg).
13. Parker v. Mead Corp., 91 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Tenn. 1949) (hernia; claimant over sixty, had bad heart condition and was not in good general health).
14. Pioneer Coal Co. v. Sparks, 249 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1952); Long v. Lotmar
Cab Co., 277 App. Div. 822, 97 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1950). A claimant, in both
cases, was held to be reasonable in refusing more surgical treatment where
prior surgery had failed to produce bone fusion.
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pain and suffering involved, 5 the considerations revealed by medical
testimony 6 and other similar factors 17 must be considered together
in reaching a conclusion. In this area, appellate courts must of necessity rely heavily upon the trial court's finding on the issue of reasonableness.' 8
In reversing the trial court and holding that it is not unreasonable
for an employee to refuse to submit to an intervertebral disc operation,
the Tennessee Supreme Court joined with a virtual unanimity of other
states that have dealt with such operations in workmen's compensation
cases. 19 However, it has generally been held that the employee's fear
alone is not sufficient to make the refusal reasonable. 20 Also, though
this is seldom mentioned in the opinions, courts are aware of the
possibility that the employee might be malingering; 21 thus, in most
cases there will be some medical testimony to the effect that his refusal
is reasonable. But courts do not have to consider the employee's
grounds for refusal if they have already decided that the operation
is dangerous or unreasonable. 22 This court's ruling is to the effect that
the proposed operation is of a major character involving some peril
to life; thus the statute cannot be construed to mean that a claimant
under compensation must submit to such an operation or his compensation will be suspended. It thus appears that if proposed treatment
15. Zant v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 40 Ga. App. 38, 148 S.E. 764 (1929).
16. Medical testimony is not conclusive. It has been held to be a question
of law as well as a question of fact. Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373,
82 A.2d 390 (1951).
In any case where the proposed operation is at least questionable any
diversity of medical opinion is likely to indicate that the claimant's refusal
was reasonable. Simmerman v. Felthauser, 125 Neb. 795, 251 N.W. 831 (1934).
17. See Ludlam, Plaintiff's Duty To Minimize Defendant's Liability By
Surgery, 17 TENN. L. REV. 821, 826-34 (1943) for a complete list of various
factors likely to be considered.
18. Pioneer Coal Co. v. Sparks, 249 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. App. 1952); 58 L.Q.
REv.292, 293 (1942).
19. In a case earlier this year, the Mississippi Supreme Court reached the
same result construing a similar statute in almost identical circumstances.
Walker v. International Paper Co., 92 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1957). The other
workmen compensation cases found involving intervertebral disc operations
are: Sultan & Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1952); United States
Coal & Coke Co. v. Lloyd, 305 Ky. 105, 203 S.W.2d 47 (1947); Dudonsky v.
L. H. Sault Constr. Co., 244 Minn. 369, 70 N.W.2d 114 (1955); Pruszenski v. Edo
Aircraft Corp., 275 App. Div. 1015, 91 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d Dep't 1949); K. Lee
Williams Theatres, Inc. v. Mickle, 201 Okla. 279, 205 P.2d 513 (1949); Mancini
v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373, 82 A.2d 390 (1951); all holding that the employee's refusal was not unreasonable.
20. Palloni v. Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit Corp., 215 App. Div. 634, 214
N.Y. Supp. 430 (3d Dep't 1926).
21. A case that does show the courts' awareness of this problem is Kricinovich v. American Car & Foundry Co., 192 Mich. 687, 159 N.W. 362, 364
(1916), to the effect that, "The apparent confusion in the testimony of the:
surgeons seems to grow out of a suspicion that the claimant was malingering."
22. In such instances courts are likely to use language to the effect that
the employee does not have to submit to an operation to decrease his employer's liability. Sultan & Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1952);
Delafield v. Maples, 2 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1941), 4 LA. L. REv. 149.
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can be classified as a major operation the employee cannot be compelled to submit to it, even where the operation is regarded as relatively safe and if successful would greatly reduce disability.
As to the nature of this injury, it seems apparent that the decision
is in line with the decided authority. Yet it is questionable whether
the court's classification into major and minor surgery, with the
result following as a matter of course from this classification, really
promotes the purpose of the statute. Such characterization as a
matter of law delimits the consideration which is likely to be given to
advancing medical knowledge and techniques. A more flexible approach would allow a proper standard of reasonableness to be applied
in the light of such medical advances. It is submitted that the basic
consideration should always be an attempt to balance the probabilities
of a significant reduction in the employee's disability 23 against the
risk of the proposed operation. 24

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-ZONING-STATE
CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY FOR USE INCONSISTENT
WITH MUNICIPAL ZONING REGULATIONS
Plaintiffs, owners of land within an area zoned by the city as
residential, sought to prevent the condemnation of this land by a
school district for use as public property.' In an original proceeding
in the state supreme court plaintiffs maintained that a zoning ordinance of the city, enacted under a state statute authorizing city zoning
and planning, prevented the erection of any school building upon the
23. A recent development which should be beneficial to courts faced with
the problem presented is the inclusion in workmen's compensation statutes of
vocational rehabilitation to assist the injured and handicapped employee to
find a useful occupation. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
544-47, app. A, table 14 (Supp. 1957) for a listing of the various jurisdictions
that have a rehabilitation provision in their workmen's compensation statute.
No such provision exists in the Tennessee statute, though such a provision
seems highly desirable. See HOLLY AND MABRY, PROTEcTIVE LArOR LEGISLATION
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN TENNESSEE 22-23, 88 (1955). In the jurisdictions
that have such a provision in their statute, this factor can be important in
helping a court determine the feasibility of a proposed operation in relation
to the best possible results to be attained by both the injured employee and
the employer, or his insurer who must pay the cost of an unfortunate mishap
and loss of manpower. For a discussion of the advantages inherent in vocational rehabilitation as part of the workmen's compensation program see
2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.20 (1952); H. and A. Somers,
Rehabilitation and Workmen's Compensation, 5 LAB. L.J. 189 (1954); Rusk,
New Hope For the Handicapped:The Rehabilitationof the Industrial Accident
Case, 3 NACCA L.J. 68 (1949).
24. Walker v. International Paper Co., 92 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1957); 1 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 13.22 (1952).
1. The school district powers were derived from, Mo.
.100 (1949).

REV. STAT.

§§ 165.010,
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land here involved.2 Held, provisional rule discharged. The power to
select, locate and procure by condemnation, if necessary, 3 sites for
public schools is vested exclusively in the school districts of the state,
and until there is an express grant from the state stating otherwise,
the city's zoning regulations cannot restrict this power. State ex. rel.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss,304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957).
Since the Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.4 both federal and state courts recognize the rights of a
municipality to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances. To be valid
these ordinances must be passed under a state enabling act or constitutional provision,5 as in the absence of such authority, there is no
inherent municipal power to enact zoning regulations. 6 However,
the power to interfere with the rights of a landowner by restricting
the character of the use of his land through zoning regulations is not
unlimited. The ordinances must be reasonable and fair in their
application and must bear a substantial relation to the public health,
safety and morals.7 When such limitations upon the land are applied
reasonably and fairly to all, they are usually upheld 8 But when a
zoning regulation goes too far in depriving a person of the use of his
property, it has been held to be a "taking" of the property for public
use without compensation and thus unconstitutional. 9
The instant case does not involve a question of the reasonableness of
the particular zoning provision but rather the effect of the state's
power of eminent domain, granted to one of its agencies, upon the
rights granted to a municipality to foster improvements within its
boundaries through zoning and building codes. 10 The rule generally
applied is that even a valid exercise of the zoning powers of a
municipality must give way when the zoning regulations conflict
2. City of Ladue's Ordinance No. 282, enacted pursuant to provisions of

Mo. REV. STAT. C. 89 (1949).
3. The statute provides for condemnation in instances where the school
district cannot agree with the owner of the land as to the price to be paid for
the same, or, for any other cause cannot secure title thereto. See note 1 supra.
4. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see 8 McQJmiLaN, MUNIcIPAL CoRPorTIONS § 25.05
(3d ed. 1957).
5. Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945); Potts v.
Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (1945); Kass v. Hedgpeth,
226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E.2d 164 (1946); Dallas v. City Packing Co., 86 S.W.2d
60, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).

6. Ibid.

7. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Miller v. Board of
Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925). See 58 Am. Jua., Zoning § 26
(1948).
8. Generally on the theory that individual hardship and loss must be borne
in order to make possible the greater advantage to the community as a whole.
9. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Youngstown v. Kahn
Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
10. Instant case, 304 S.W.2d at 897. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between the two, "eminent domain" and "zoning," see 1 METZENBAUM,
LAW OF ZONING 70-80 (2d ed. 1955).
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with the power of the sovereign state or any of its agencies to condemn
land and erect buildings or other improvements for public use.11
However, two limitations to the above rule are generally recognized.
If the land is to be used in conducting a proprietary rather than a
12
governmental function, the zoning regulations need not give way.
It is also usually said that the zoning regulations will prevail over
the state's power to condemn if the statute enabling the municipality
to establish such regulations, 13 or the statute creating a state agency
with power to condemn,14 expressly so provides. In pointing out why
the instant case does not fall within these limitations the court says
that the statute here involved clearly contains no expressed grant of
power to cities to regulate or restrict the location of schools or other
public buildings; and that the selection, location and procurement of
a site through condemnation for use as a public school is a govern5
mental and not a proprietary function.'
Though the conclusion reached by the instant court is in line with
the great majority of cases,16 there are several factors to consider
concerning the principle of law followed therein. It should be noted
first that had there been a rezoning of the area to allow either a public
or private school, the zoning regulation might have been held unreasonable. 17 Second, in many states if the land acquired by the
11. Davidson County v. Harmon, 292 S.W.2d 777, (Tenn. 1956); 8 McQuILBut see Charleston v.
Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W.Va. 666, 64 S.E.2d 676 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).
12. Jefferson County v. Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951)
(operation of sewage disposal plant); Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 3 Ill.
LN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.15 (3d ed. 1957).

2d 388, 121 N.E.2d 495 (1954)

(municipal corporation selling water to

individuals); Taber v. City of Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324
(1937) (city operating and maintaining a waterworks system); O'Brien v.
Town of Greenburgh, 239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y. Supp. 173 (2d Dep't 1933)
(disposal of garbage).
13. See, e.g., Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y v. Town of Woodbury, 230
App. Div. 228, 243 N.Y. Supp. 686, 692 (2d Dep't 1930). "A state policy may
not be ignored by a municipality unless it is specifically empowered so to do in
terms clear and explicit."
14. West v. Housing Authority, 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E. 30 (1954) (Note, however, though the defendant was amenable to the local zoning ordinances of
the city, compliance therewith was not a condition precedent to the condemning of private property under power of eminent domain).
15. Instant case, 304 S.W.2d 902-03.
16. Union Free School Dist. v. Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 198 Misc. 932,
102 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (village could not through zoning laws prevent
school district from acquiring private property for use as a school site);
State ex tel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n. v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168 107 N.E.2d 345
(1952) (state turnpike not invalid in passing through territory in violation of
zoning ordinances); Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W. Va. 666,
64 S.E.2d 676 (1950) (office building constructed by state commission not
subject to city zoning ordinance).
17. Though it is generally recognized that the courts are hesitant about
disturbing the decision of the zoning boards, where there is clearly an abuse
of its discretion they will do so. See, e.g., Endara v. Culver City, 140 Cal. App.
2d 33, 294 P.2d 1003 (1956); Davis v. Omaha, 153 Neb. 460, 45 N.W.2d 172
(1950). The same result could also be reached by the court by finding that
it was an unlawful taking, or a case of spot zoning. "[T]he power to establish
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eminent domain proceedings had been burdened with easements or
restrictive covenants, the surrounding land owners would have received compensation for the loss of their property right.18 Here there
has been an extinguishment of a substantial interest of the landowners
within the zoning area without compensation. As it is, only the owner
of the condemned land receives compensation, and the neighboring
landowners receive nothing for their interest which is infringed by
nonenforcement of the zoning regulation. It has been stated that "no
community can now call itself modern or progressive unless it has
some planning program and has directed some effort toward the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance."' 19 With this realization of the importance of zoning laws to our communities, perhaps it
is time to recognize that those who have built or purchased homes
under the protection of a zoning ordinance should be compensated for
the loss of their interest where a public agency deprives them of the
benefits of the ordinance.

REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-CO-TENANT
CLAIMS TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION AGAINST
OTHER CO-TENANTS
W. C. Eckhardt, tenant in common with four other persons in two
lots numbered 30 and 31,1 purchased the interests of the others in lot
30. There was some evidence that Eckhardt believed that he was
acquiring both lots, but in fact he purchased lot 30 only. On the death
of the life tenant of the two lots Eckhardt took possession of both,
claiming the entire interest in both and renting out lot 31. He received
all the rents from this lot and made no accounting to his co-tenants.
Eckhardt held lot 31 in this capacity from 1935 until his death in 1946,
at which time he bequeathed all his property to his wife, the defendant.
There was no specific description of the property in the will. Defendant took possession and held the lot in the same capacity as Eckhardt
2
until the date of this suit in 1955, in all a period of over twenty years.
Plaintiffs, tenants in common with Eckhardt, then brought this action
to determine title to the lot, and the chancellor held for defendant.
zones is a police power and its exercise cannot be extended beyond the accomplishment of purposes rightly within the scope of that power." City of
Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1944).
18. See JAHR, EMINENT DOMVAIN § 160 (1953); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
f 686 (1956).
19. 1 YOKLY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 15 (2d ed. 1953).

1. The interest in these lots was an undivided remainder subject to a life
estate. 305 S.W.2d at 347.
2. For a general discussion of tacking in adverse possession see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 464 (1944); Comment, 23 TENN. L. REV. 295, 301 (1954).
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On appeal held, affirmed. Although there has been no such ouster of

the other co-tenants as to put title in defendant by adverse possession,
exclusive and uninterrupted possession for a period of twenty years
during which time defendant and her husband claimed the entire interest established title by prescription under the theory of a lost
grant. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 305 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. App. 1957).
In general where land is owned by tenants in common the possession
of one is eo nomine the possession of all, and one tenant in common
cannot hold adversely as against the others until he has made an
actual ouster of them. 3 This ouster must be so open and hostile as to
the other co-tenants that the intention to disseise is unmistakable. 4
Interests in land may also be gained through prescription under the
theory of a lost grant; but this method of perfecting title, a concept
distinct from adverse possession,5 normally applies only to incorporeal
interests in land.6 However, in Tennessee it is also extended to corporeal interests. 7 In Tennessee the exclusive and uninterrupted possession by one tenant in common of land holding such as his own for
twenty years raises a rebuttable 8 presumption of an ouster, release or
whatever else is necessary to protect his title if the other co-tenants
are under no disability to assert their rights during this time. This
operates to vest the title in such a possessor under the theory of a
lost grant. 9
While the more common adverse possession statutes vest in the
possessor a title as complete as one obtained by deed, under the adverse possession statutes of Tennessee' ° without color of title, only a
defensive title can be obtained through the statutory period of adverse
possession." Thus the common law theory of title by prescription arising from twenty years exclusive and uninterrupted possession, by
giving a complete title, complements the statutory remedies in furtherance of the public policy of quieting titles in land.'2 The practice
of applying the doctrine of prescription and the theory of a lost grant
3. 2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY § 127 (1947); Annot., 121 A.L.R. 1411 (1939).
4. Turnipseed v. Moseley, 248 Ala. 340, 27 So. 2d 483, (1946); Marr's Heirs v.
Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488 (1860).
5. See Note, 5 VAND.L. REv. 621, 622 (1952).
6. SITH, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 267 (1956); 1 THOMPSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 417 (2d ed. 1939).
7. Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329 (1872); Lessee of Brock v. Burchett, 32
Tenn. 11 (1852).
8. '"Whatever will rebut the fact of an adverse possession under the statute
of limitations should, upon principle, rebut and repel the presumption of a
grant or other title founded upon twenty years' possession." Lessee of Brock
v. Burchett, supranote 7, at 14.
9. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946 (1915); Hilton v. Duncan,
41 Tenn. 313 (1860).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 28-201, 28-203 (1956).
11. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827 (1948); Moffitt
v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463 (1946).
12. Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329 (1872); Cannon v. Phillips, 34 Tenn. 211,
214 (1854); 2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY § 239 at 603 (1947).
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to corporeal as well as incorporeal interests in land in Tennessee is
traceable as far back as 1827.13 This practice has continued without
serious challenge from that date up through the instant case, 14 the
effect being that what other jurisdictions have done through legislative
action has been accomplished by the courts in Tennessee. However,
as witnessed by the instant case, this effect has gone well beyond that
reached by the more common adverse possession statutes. In the
instant case the court recognized that the presumption of an ouster
among tenants in common is rebuttable by certain facts. 15 Yet even
though the facts of this case repudiate any inference of an actual
ouster, the court holding that in fact there was no ouster, 16 and even
though it was evident that no grant in fact had ever been made, still
it was held that the trier of fact could infer an ouster, release or other
thing necessary to protect the title in the possessor. Although the
result is unusual in that it allows the trier of fact to make a finding
inconsistent with what appear to be the established facts, this holding
follows the precedent of existing case law in Tennessee.
Eminent textwriters agree in their condemnation of the lost grant
doctrine as being no more than a mere fiction having no place in
modern day law.17 Tennessee is the only state that applies this archaic
theory to corporeal interests in land. Why should Tennessee continue
to pay homage to this fiction? Since the underlying principle for
recognizing these titles by prescription is the same as that for the
adverse possession statutes, namely the public policy of quieting titles
in land,' 8 would not the people of Tennessee be better served by a
reappraisal and restatement of this area of the law? The problem now
belongs to the legislature, not to the courts which would continue to
be plagued by stare decisis. The Tennessee Legislature can and should
remove the inconsistencies and uncertainties in this area of the law by
following the example of other states and enacting a statute which
13. Hanes v. Peck's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 556 (1827). It is interesting to note that
thirty years exclusive and uninterrupted possession was required and satisfied
in this case.
14. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946 (1915); Dunn v. Eaton,
92 Tenn. 743, 23 S.W. 163 (1893); Burns v. Headerick, 85 Tenn. 102, 2 S.W. 259
(1886); Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169 (1885); Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn.
329 (1872); Marr's Heirs v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488 (1860); Cannon v. Phillips,
34 Tenn. 211 (1854); Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279 (1853); Lessee
of Brock v. Burchett, 32 Tenn. 11 (1852); Gilchrist v. McGee, 17 Tenn. 455
(1836); Hanes v. Peck's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 556 (1827).
15. "[I]t may be rebutted by the infancy or coverture of the plaintiffs, or by
the intervention of a particular estate, the relation of the parties, or other
facts showing that the possession was not adverse to the owner, but by his
permission or indulgence, or as his tenant." 305 S.W.2d at 348, citing Marr's
Heirs v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 501-02 (1860).
16. 305 S.W.2d at 348.
17. BuRY, REAL PROPERTY § 669 (1954); 2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY § 239 at
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(1947); Simonton, Fictional Lost Grant in Prescription-A Nocuous

Archaism, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 46 (1928).

18. 1 Am. Jun., Adverse Possession § 4 (1936); see note 11 supra.
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will replace the decayed and dishonored theory of the lost grant.
Under such a statute, since the finding of an actual ouster would be
necessary, the holding of the instant case would doubtless have been
reversed.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTION

OF NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiff-insurance company, subrogee of the owners of a supermarket, sued the owner of a truck for damages resulting from a collision of the truck with the supermarket. The theory of the suit was
negligence on the part of the truck driver, and allegations were made
by the plaintiff that the building had been approached in a negligent
manner, that the building had been struck and damaged and that
there were specific duties on the part of the driver that had not been
followed. The defendant's answer denied the charge of negligent
driving and attributed the collision to an act of God in the form of
an icy condition of the area contiguous to the building. At the close
of plaintiff's proof the defendant's motion for a judgment of no cause
of action was granted on the ground that there were "missing links"
in the plaintiff's proof. On appeal, held, reversed. Plaintiff's proof of
damage and of the surrounding circumstances, together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the situation, created a "presumption of negligence" and presented a question of fact for jury
determination. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matthew Stores,
84 N.W.2d 755 (Mich. 1957).
The fact situation presented by the instant case would seem to be
one that would generally be decided by application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. 1 This doctrine 2 is customarily invoked when (1) the
particular injury would not ordinarily have occurred except for
negligence, (2) the cause or instrumentality of the injury was under
the control and management of the defendant, and (3) the plaintiff as
a cause is eliminated. 3 The effect of application of the doctrine differs
among the jurisdictions. The majority of the jurisdictions adhering to
the doctrine hold that it is simply a form of circumstantial evidence
which creates an inference of negligence from which the jury may or
may not find negligence. 4 A minority holds that a meeting of the
1. Bryne v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass. 130, 168 N.E. 540
(1929); Whitwell v. Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299 (1914); Manker v.

Shaffer, 161 Ohio St. 285, 118 N.E.2d 641 (1954).

2. The phrase is variously referred to as a doctrine, principle or rule.
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955). The author also states that some courts
have added a fourth element-that the explanation of the accident must be
more accessible to the defendant than the plaintiff. See also 9 WIGMORm, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).

4. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913); Colorado Springs & Interurban
Ry. v. Reese, 69 Colo. 1, 169 Pac. 572 (1917); Kleinman v. Banner Laundry
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requirements of res ipsa loquitur creates a presumption of negligence
which allows the court to instruct the jury that a verdict must be
found for the plaintiff unless the defendant's evidence rebuts the
presumption.5 An extremely limited number of states profess to
apply the doctrine only in circumscribed areas 6 or categorically state
that it is inapplicable within the confines of their jurisdiction.7
The court in the instant case is one that has traditionally taken the
position that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply within its
jurisdiction,8 but that a "presumption of negligence"9 can arise where
Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123 (1921); Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills,
139 N.C. 490, 52 S.E. 121 (1905); Glowacki v. North Western Ohio Ry. & Power
Co., 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21 (1927). For additional cases, see 38 Am.
JuR., Negligence § 309 (1941). That this is the majority position, see PROSSER,
TORTS § 43 (2d ed. 1955); and for an early classification of the jurisdictions,
see Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv.
241 (1936).
5. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204, 84 N.E. 13 (1908);

Fitch v. Mason City & C. L. Traction Co., 124 Iowa 665, 100 N.W. 618 (1904);

Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947); Alabama & V. Ry. v.
Groome, 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703 (1910). That this is the minority position,
see PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (2d ed. 1955). For additional cases, see Annot., 53
A.L.R. 1502 (1928).
6. Pennsylvania would seem to apply the rule where a contractual relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant. In Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa.
376, 133 Atl. 568 (1926), where plaintiff bought a movie ticket and was injured
by a faulty chair, the court explicitly denied any application of res ipsa
loquitur and then applied rules that definitely sound of res ipsa. The court
held, at 133 Atl. 569: "'When the thing which causes the injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendants, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence -of explanation
by the defendants that the accident arose from a want of care.'" A related Pennsylvania rule is that a defendant will be liable for negligence
where the plaintiff is damaged by an instrumentality within the "exclusive
control" of the defendant, and the defendant is unable to show that he had
used due care in operation of the damaging instrumentality. Trouser Corp.
v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1946); Loch v. Confair, 372
Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) (where the rule was applied to a beverage bottler,
and the plaintiff was a grocery shopper). Pennsylvania does not apply res
ipsa loquitur to injuries caused by falling objects, Pope v. Reading Co., 304
Pa. 326, 156 Atl. 106 (1931); nor to injuries received by invitee when invitee
falls on stairway of defendant due to soft substance under newspaper on stairs,
De Clerico v. Gimbel Bros., 160 Pa. Super. 197, 50 A.2d 716 (1947); nor for
injuries to lessee's guest due to fall on an unlighted stairway, Fay v. 900 North
63rd Street Corp., 137 Pa. Super. 496, 9 A.2d 483 (1939).
7. Carroll v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E.2d 729 (1947);
Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153 (1942). In Merchant
v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d 749 (1949), res ipsa
is said to be repudiated, but that negligence may be proven by "circumstantial
evidence" is affirmed. However, it has been said in South Carolina that when
damage occurs while goods are in the possession of a warehouseman-bailee, a
"prima facie" case is made for negligence which "shadows" the statement that
res ipsa is not followed. Albergotti v. Dixie Produce Co., 202 S.C. 357, 25 S.E.2d
156 (1943). Thus it would seem that South Carolina incontrovertibly repudiates res ipsa and is content to use circumstantial evidence, when necessary, to
prove negligence.
8. Ford Motor Co. v. Bradley Transp. Co., 174 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949);
Detroit Edison Co. v. Knowles, 152 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1945); Laxton v. Hatzel
& Buehler, Inc., 142 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1944); Moore v. Traverse City Masonic
Bldg. Ass'n, 324 Mich. 507, 37 N.W.2d 457 (1949); Trafamczak v. Anys, 320
Mich. 653, 31 N.W.2d 832 (1948) (dictum); Mitchell v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
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circumstances take the case out of the realm of conjecture and put it
within the field of reasonable inferences from established facts. This
approach is substantially the same as the majority rule of the res ipsa
loquitur jurisdictions, and after the court has considered the two
approaches and discussed them, there is doubt as to whether the
Michigan presumption of negligence rule has been followed in the case
or whether the court has finally adopted the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. A comparison of the two rules shows that both apply to
circumstantial evidence and that once the requirements of either are
met the plaintiff's case may be submitted to the jury10 for a fact
determination of whether the defendant is liable for negligence. A
difference between the two is that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
requires a meeting of specified elements, generally three in number,1 1
before the doctrine is invoked. The present court, which heretofore
clearly shunned res ipsa loquitur 12 does not require a specified number
of elements to be met before invoking its presumption of negligence
rule. Once a "presumption of negligence" is created under the Michigan rule,13 binding instructions upon the jury are not mandatory-but
309 Mich. 231, 15 N.W.2d 144 (1944); Hazen v. Rockefeller, 303 Mich. 536,
6 N.W.2d 770 (1942) (dictum).
9. Soltar v. Anderson, 340 Mich. 242, 65 N.W.2d 777 (1954); Spiers v. Martin,
336 Mich. 613, 58 N.W.2d 821 (1953); Curtis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 298 Mich.
539, 299 N.W. 706 (1941); Heppenstall Steel Co. v. Wabash Ry., 242 Mich.
464, 219 N.W. 717 (1928) ; Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 201, 203 N.W. 868 (1925).
One of the clearest expressions of the Michigan view is found in Barnowski
v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523, 50 N.W. 989 (1891), where the Court said: "It is true
that the mere fact of an injury does not impute negligence on the part of

any one, but, where a thing happens which would not ordinarily have occurred
if due care had been used, the fact of such happening raises a presumption of
negligence in some one." 50 N.W. at 989. Perhaps the most cited expression is
found in Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry., 206 Mich. 545, 173 N.W. 360, 361
(1919): "This court has not adopted the rule res ipsa loquitur. We have uniformly held that the happening of the accident alone is not evidence of negligence; and we have as uniformly held that negligence may be established by
circumstantial evidence, and that, where the circumstances are such as to take
the case out of the realm of conjecture and within the field of legitimate inferences from established facts, at least a prima facie case is made [citing
cases] . ..."
10. That res ipsa entitles plaintiff to jury determination, see cases cited in
notes 4 and 5 supra; and that a meeting of the Michigan presumption of negligence requirements allows a jury determination, see note 9 supra. If no jury
is involved, the court decides the matter. Ford Motor Co. v. Bradley Transp.
Co., 174 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949); Hazen v. Rockefeller, 303 Mich. 536, 6 N.W.2d
770 (1942). The same criteria seem to be followed as for the jury cases, but
the courts do not use the phrase "presumption of negligence." Possibly this is
because saying that a presumption arises in the court's mind and that it can
be dispelled seems too apparent.
11. See note 3 supra. Once the requirements are met, either an inference of
negligence, as shown by note 4 supra, or a presumption of negligence, as shown
by note 5 supra, is created, depending on the effect given to res ipsa by the
particular jurisdiction. And the res ipsa jurisdictions that hold a presumption
of negligence is created hold that the court must instruct the jury that the
plaintiff shall win the case unless the defendant's evidence rebuts the presumption.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. For Michigan's test, see note 9 supra.
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the case may go to the jury for determination of whether the defendant
was negligent.' 4
A careful study of the court's past decisions and its more recent ones
would seem to reveal that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has not
been adopted in the instant case and that the court's particular "presumption of negligence" rule still prevails. However, there are indications that the determination to refrain from using the phrase "res
ipsa loquitur" is weakening, 5 and there is evidence that the court is
preparing to adopt the phrase as an expression of Michigan's law in
the field.' 6 The court can retain its present position and still let a jury
arrive at a determination of negligence without direct evidence, 7 and
undoubtedly there are times when such direct evidence is unobtainable, even though an issue of negligence is presented. If the phrase is
adopted, it would seem that sometime in the future the court must
decide whether or not to apply the crystallized elements that are
part of res ipsa loquitur rather than the general requirements of its
present presumption of negligence rule; and eventually the problem
of whether to use three or four elements will probably present itself.' 8
14. See note 9 supra. One can see that the effect created by Michigan's presumption of negligence rule differs from the minority "presumption of negligence" res ipsa jurisdictions in that the former leaves the determination of
negligence to the jury and the latter determines that the plaintiff shall win
the case unless the defendant's evidence disproves negligence.
15. Instant case, 84 N.W.2d at 762: "As noted above, Dean King says we
do apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Justice Carr feels otherwise. 'This
Court,' he says, 'has never approved the res ipsa loquitur rule. Higdon v.
Carlebach, supra. Which is right? The real difficulty here lies in an embarrassment of riches. Both may be right.
"[T]here can be no doubt whatever that as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is defined by one of the great masters of our law, we do have it and we do
apply it in this jurisdiction."
The court then goes on to quote Justice Holmes, who said in Graham v.
Badger, 164 Mass. 42, 41 N.E. 61 (1895): "'Res ipsa loqultur,' which is merely
a short way of saying that, so far as the court can see, the jury from their
experience as men of the world, may be warranted in thinking that an accident
of this particular kind commonly does not happen except in consequence of
negligence, and that therefore there is a presumption of fact, in the absence of
explanation or other evidence which the jury believe, that it happened in
consequence of negligence in this case." These excerpts from the opinion of
the instant case would seem to indicate that the court is trying to identify
its own rule with the majority res ipsa rule.
16. "It is too late, in our opinion, to insist that res ipsa loquitur, as above
defined [by Justice Holmes] . . .does not apply in this State." Instant case,
84 N.W.2d at 763. See also Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296
(1957). Both the instant case and the Higdon case contained concurring opinions that attempted to halt any leaning toward res ipsa. With encouragement
from this "old school" the Michigan court would then seem to be willing to
adopt res ipsa loquitur.
17. See cases cited notes 4 and 5 supra.
18. See note 3 supra.

